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INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations embarked
upon at Punta del Este seven and one-half years ago was among the
most ambitious and comprehensive sets of trade negotiations ever con-
ducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Negotiations on this scale have not occurred since the
post-World War II talks resulting in the ill-fated Havana Charter agree-
ment. The Uruguay Round negotiations have been described as the most
extensive and far-reaching talks in the history of international trade
relations.'
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Final Act) provides an impressive array
of agreements, creating new international obligations in the area of
services with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
extending GATT's obligations to protection of intellectual property
rights with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement). The Final Act both clarifies and
extends existing GATT obligations in virtually every facet of its charter,
notably in obligations on subsidies and countervailing measures. In one
of its most impressive successes, the Final Act of the Uruguay Round
provides a unified dispute resolution regime in the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute
Settlement Understanding or DSU). Perhaps the crowning achievement
of the negotiating round, notwithstanding its other notable accomplish-
ments, is the new institutional Charter for the World Trade Organization
(World Trade Organization or WTO), designed to help facilitate interna-
tional cooperation on trade and economic relations.2
In their provisional analysis, GATT economists' have proposed that
the Uruguay Round results on market access will mean substantial world
1. Warren A. Lavorel, The World Trade Organization: The Way to the Future, in WAR-
REN A. LAVOREL & CARSTEN THOMAS EBENROTH, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
WAY TO THE FUTURE 7 (1994).
2. See Uruguay Round Legislation, Mar. 23, 1994, Hearings Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson) [hereinafter
Jackson Testimony].
[Vol. 16:349
Winter 1995] World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order 351
income gains of approximately $235 billion annually and trade gains of
$755 billion annually by the year 2002. GATT economists conclude that
a major increase in market access security will be achieved through a
higher number of tariff bindings. Security on industrial products will
increase from seventy-eight to ninety-nine percent in developed coun-
tries and twenty-two to seventy-two percent in developing countries.
GATT analysts suggest that there will be 100 percent security for agri-
cultural products because of tariffication and bindings negotiated during
the Uruguay Round. Moreover, there is a thirty-eight percent overall cut
in developed countries' tariffs on industrial products, from 6.3 to 3.9
percent.3 Nevertheless it remains controversial whether all WTO Mem-
bers will share in these benefits. Some commentators suggest that cer-
tain developing countries might experience a net detriment following
implementation of the obligations of the newly completed round.4
This article will describe in some detail the most dramatic modifica-
tions within the framework of the multilateral trading system designed
to support the projected trade expansion, namely, the new organizational
structure under the WTO and the new dispute settlement procedures.
The article will evaluate these changes against the backdrop of the
Bretton Woods System as originally conceived and will highlight the
debate surrounding whether the nature of the trade regulating body
ought to be adjudicatory or negotiatory. Finally, the author offers con-
clusions, perspectives, and comments regarding the future development
of the world trading system.
A. Historical Background: The Bretton Woods
System and the GATT.
Approximately forty-seven years ago, the international community
made its first concerted attempt at multilateral accord in the arena of
international economic relations. Named for the international conference
on economic relations which took place shortly after World War II, the
Bretton Woods System was originally designed as an integrated effort
by the international community to encourage trade liberalization and
multilateral economic cooperation. The framers of that system believed
that the disastrous tariff and trade policies of the 1930s had contributed
to the outbreak of the Second World War. They desired to create a
multilateral institutional framework of rules and obligations on economic
3. The foregoing figures are taken from Focus, GATT NEWSL. (May 1994), at 6.
4. See, e.g., Kevin Watkins, GATT: A Victory for the North, 59 REv. AFR. POL. EcON.
60 (1994).
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relations which would encourage multilateral agreement and avoid
economic conflict. 5
The Bretton Woods System was to consist of three major interna-
tional organizations designed to administer and harmonize world trade:
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or IBRD); and the ill-
fated International Trade Organization (ITO). These three organizations
were seen as the three legs upon which the new multilateral economic
system should rest. They were to cooperate and assist one another in the
pursuit of their individual and collective goals. The IMF and the World
Bank were to cover the financial side of the international economic
equation. The World Bank was originally designed to assist the war-torn
developed countries and lesser developed nations to reconstruct or
upgrade their economies. The IMF was initially charged with facilitating
trade and assisting governments in stabilizing their exchange rates so as
to avoid a reversion to 1930s monetary policies which had stifled world
trade and abetted tensions leading to the second great war of the twenti-
eth century. At the center of the Bretton Woods plan was, in the words
of Richard Gardner, the idea for a "comprehensive code to govern the
conduct of world trade" which had been negotiated in the Havana
Charter.6 The ITO, the executive organ provided for in the Havana
Charter, would have administered the Charter's agreements and gov-
erned disputes arising out of its wide range of obligations. Those obliga-
tions encompassed issues related to commercial policy, such as trade
and trade barriers, labor and employment, economic development and
reconstruction, restrictive business practices, and intergovernmental
commodity agreements. The Havana Charter transcended every previous
attempt to regulate trade relations. Its nine chapters and 106 articles
covered the entire range of trade issues and contained both general
statements of principle and definite commitments of national policy
dealing primarily with national barriers to trade. The range of commit-
ment to the dismantlement of trade barriers was comprehensive, as
illustrated by the Charter's fifty-five articles covering all types of restric-
tions on trade. Unfortunately, due primarily to a lack of political will in
5. See generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
6. RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: ANGLO-AMERICAN COL-
LABORATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 101 (1956).
7. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF 2/78, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 3206 (1948). The Havana Charter
provided commitments on Tariffs, Preferences, and Internal Taxation and Regulation, id. ch.
IV, arts. 16-19; Quantitative Restrictions and Related Exchange Matters, id. arts. 20-24;
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the United States, the Havana Charter was never ratified, and the ITO
failed to materialize.
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
With the failure of the Havana Charter and the ITO, the GATT
became the principal international agreement regulating trade between
nations. 8 The GATT's beginnings in Geneva, Switzerland in the Spring
of 1947 were somewhat inconspicuous as the GATT was overshadowed
by events surrounding the reconstruction of a devastated European con-
tinent and other more ambitious multilateral efforts to regulate interna-
tional economic relations such as the Havana Charter. When the Presi-
dent of the United States invited twenty-three nations to participate in
the first ever multilateral tariff cutting talks at the Geneva Conference,
negotiations over the more comprehensive Havana Charter were already
under way. As the little brother to the Havana Charter, the GATT
resembled its multifaceted sibling in its basic principles. Like the Ha-
vana Charter, the GATT contained most favored nation, nondiscrimina-
tion, and national treatment clauses, as well as other obligations, but it
was convened for the very specific and limited purpose of tariff reduc-
tion. Intended only as a modest component in the broader post-war
economic and political plans envisioned at Bretton Woods, the GATT
was to play a small but important gap-bridging role until the economic
agreements of the Havana Charter came into force. Tariff rates had
remained at their high pre-war levels and threatened the desired speedy
economic recovery of war-torn Europe. In response, President Truman
called for the first multilateral tariff cutting talks in an effort to jump-
Subsidies, id. arts. 25-28; State Trading and Related Matters, id. arts. 29-32; General
Commercial Provisions on Freedom of Transit, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, id.
arts. 33-39; Special Provisions for Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions and Consultation,
id. arts. 40-45; Restrictive Business Practices, id. ch. V, arts. 46-54; and Inter-Governmental
Commodity Agreements, id. ch. VI, arts. 55-70.
8. The classic work describing the GAIT and its legal obligations is JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969) [hereinafter LAW OF GATT]. Other key
works include: KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION (Midway reprint, 1977) and ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975) [hereinafter GATT LEGAL SYSTEM].
In the Uruguay Round Final Act, the GATT is referred to as the GATT 1947 throughout
and is furthermore incorporated, with important exceptions, into the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, Part II, ann. IA, para. 1, GATT Doc. No.
MTN/FA, - U.S.Tt -, 33 l.L.M. 1130, 1145 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. For an explana-
tion of the parts of the Final Act, see infra part I.A. In conformity with the Final Act's usage,
the author will refer to the GAT as the GATT 1947 where appropriate, but will also retain
the original designation of GATT when.referring to the multilateral trading system as it has
evolved under the GATT 1947 obligations.
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start European economies through tariff reductions. For good measure
many of the Havana Charter obligations just mentioned were added to
the mix of tariff concessions. When the Havana Charter failed to enter
into force, its organizational institution, the ITO, also perished, leaving
the GATT alone to administer matters of trade between nations.
The GATT has scored impressive successes in its forty-seven year
history, especially in reducing world tariff levels, but it was clear from
its beginnings that it was ill-equipped to handle the broader task of
regulating world trade relations without some fundamental improve-
ments. 9 Although it has acquired through the years a quasi-organization-
al status,' ° the GATT was not originally intended to be an international
organization on trade. Creating an organizational charter for the pact had
been specifically avoided because it was intended that the GATT should
be administered by the ITO as it was to be incorporated into the Havana
Charter. It quickly became apparent that the GATT's institutional frame-
work, including its dispute resolution mechanisms, were lacking. Its
accession, achieved through the Protocol of Provisional Application, led
to GATT's weak application in national law. Additionally, a resurgence
of protectionist pressures began to slow the remaining momentum for
multilateral trade cooperation and exposed further weaknesses in the
GATT regime. The power of the Contracting Parties to amend and
interpret the GATT Agreement remained controversial and resulted in
the need to amend the accord through subsequent negotiating rounds and
side pacts rather than direct reform or interpretation. Thus, the GATT
was forced, as John Jackson characterizes it, into a state of "constant
improvisation" in order to achieve desired results.
The GATT's weaknesses included its provisional application and
grandfather rights exceptions, ambiguity about the powers of the Con-
tracting Parties to make certain decisions and waiver authority, the
murky legal status of the GATT as an international institution, problems
with dispute settlement, and a lack of constitutional provisions in GATT
which have led to the need for continual invention.' 2 Analysts have
9. LAW OF GATT, supra note 8, at 49-57.
10. Id. at 121; Dam, supra note 8, at 335; OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN
THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 45 (1985); Miquel Montafit i Mora, A GAIT with
Teeth: Law wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM.
J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 105, 107-08 (1993).
11. Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 196.
12. See id.; see also ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 221-44 (1991); JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 91-103 (1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
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pointed to problems of multilateral rights and obligations such as the
application of the Tokyo Round Codes, the weakness of the rule of law
in GATT, 3 and various other "constitutional" problems of the GATT .
4
I. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The framers of the WTO specifically designed it to remedy many of
GATT's organizational shortcomings. It has been described as a mini-
malist institution1 5 and is entirely institutional and procedural in chariac-
ter, unlike the ITO which had contained substantive obligations all its
own. Although its Charter is somewhat thin in comparison to that of the
ITO, the WTO plays the essential role of unifying the existing and new
obligations under one administrative roof and further providing an
internationally recognized organizational structure which its forerunner,
the GATT, had lacked. The Uruguay Round Final Act offers a new
GATT 1994 which absorbs the original GATT 1947 and its subsequent
side agreements, the results of previous rounds, and many of its deci-
sions and waivers. The administration of the agreements on trade in
goods in the GATT 1994 and the new multilateral obligations beyond
the scope of trade in goods embodied in the GATS and TRIPs Agree-
ments will be the main function of the WTO, a role the GATT could
fulfill only with great difficulty considering its competence extended
only to tariffs and trade in goods. Accordingly, in the WTO a unified
administrative organ is created for all of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. This unification solves two problems. First, the difficulty of
incorporating the non-trade-in-goods obligations of protection of in-
tellectual property rights and trade in services into the GATT is resolved
by the WTO, which "separates the institutional concepts from the sub-
stantive rules."' 6 Second, the establishment of the WTO settles the
question of institutional status which has hindered GATT in its nearly
five decades of history. Despite commentary to the contrary, especially
in the U.S. Congress, the WTO presents neither a qualitative change in
the scope and functions of GATT nor the advent of a supranational
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
299-308 (1991); PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 242-52
(1993).
13. Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Strengthening the International Legal Framework of
the GATT MTN System: A Comment, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 26-27 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds. 1991) [hereinafter NEW
GA'IT ROUND].
14. See id. part I.
15. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, 'at 196-99.
16. Id. at 197.
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trade institution with power and authority to usurp sovereignty from its
Member Nations. Rather, the WTO will be guided by the decisions,
procedures, and customary practices of the GATT. 7 As Professor Jack-
son, the author of an earlier draft of what was to become the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), stated in
his testimony to the Senate Finance Committee about the WTO, it "has
no more real power than that which existed for the GATT under the
previous agreements."' 8
The controversy surrounding the ratification of the WTO and the
Covered Agreements echoed in some respects the circumstances that led
to the stillbirth of the ITO. But as we shall see, although there are
substantial similarities between the present debate accompanying ratifi-
cation of the new international trade agreements and that of the ITO, it
would be premature to speak of the WTO's demise. In fact, the U.S.
Congress voted in December of 1994 to ratify the Uruguay Round
Agreement. 9
The WTO, the agreement establishing it, and the agreements an-
nexed to its Charter seek to reestablish the momentum and scope of the
multilateral trading system lost with the failure of the ITO and the
Havana Charter. But before the WTO can become operational, it must
find acceptance in the European Union (EU) as well as among other
future Members. The ITO failed for the very reason that it was not
accepted by the U.S. Congress and was, in fact, never brought before it
for a vote. Distrust of international organizations such as the United
Nations among the U.S. electorate and the U.S. Congress led President
Truman to withdraw his request for a Senate vote on the ITO.20 The
chances for acceptance of the WTO, on the other hand, appear at present
very good, so that with time and in all likelihood, it will come to fill out
the role of its once all but forgotten ancestor. Nevertheless, ominous
rumblings coming out of Washington regarding the threat of the WTO
to U.S. environmental standards, concerns about U.S. sovereignty over
its trade policy, and the present problem of making up budget shortfalls
for tariff losses raise questions as to the ultimate status of the WTO and
17. Final Act, supra note 8, part II, art. XVI, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1152.
18. Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 197.
19. The WTO was approved by Congress in an extraordinary post-election session on
December 8, 1994.
20. GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES
AND TECHNIQUES 15-33 (1965).
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its agreements in the national law of the United States, which is so
important to the question of its future effectiveness as arbiter of world
trade.2'
In the preamble to the WTO Agreement, the parties to the agree-
ment, or "Members" as they are now called, resolve themselves:
to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading .system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all the
results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.22
Thus, as we shall see, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which has heretofore governed issues related to international trade
between its contracting parties, is to be superseded by the WTO.
A. The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations includes three main parts: Part I contain-
ing the Final.Act; Part Ii comprising the WTO Agreement and its an-
nexes, the Multilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Uruguay
Round Agreements); and, Part III consisting of the Ministerial Decisions
and Declarations. The Final Act declares that the WTO Agreement will
enter into force on January 1, 1995 or no later than "early 1995. "23
Presently, it appears that despite calls for earliest possible implementa-
tion on January 1, 1995, the WTO may enter force sometime during the
course of 1995 at the earliest.
Under the WTO Agreement, the World Trade Organization is autho-
rized to administer and implement the Multilateral and Plurilateral Trade
Agreements and resolve disputes between its Members arising out of the
Uruguay Round Agreements. These agreements, comprising the lion's
share of the Final Act, include amendments, interpretations, and under-
standings involving existing GATT agreements and a number of new
agreements which dramatically expand the scope of its international
21. For a thorough discussion of the WTO's obligations and its status in United States
and European Union law, see Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The New Multilateral Trading System:
Diplomacy and the Rule of Law in the International Control of Legal Instruments of Foreign
Trade 198-217 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter New Multilateral Trading System].
22. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 1144 (emphasis added).
23. See Final Act, supra note 8, Part 1, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1143. In Part I, the Final
Act declares that Parts II and III "embody the results of [the participants'] negotiations and
form an integral part of this Final Act." ld. para. 1.
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trade obligations. First, the Final Act includes, as one of the annexes to
the WTO Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994),4 which incorporates the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade of 1947 (as incorporated into the GATT 1994, "GATT
1947").25 The GATT 1947 was incorporated into the GATT 1994 minus
the Protocol of Provisional Application, the stipulation which was
primarily responsible for limiting the GATT's application in national
law. The GATT 1994 and GATT 1947, as modified by the Final Act's
WTO Agreement at Annex IA, are legally distinct agreements.2 6 In the
event of a conflict between the GATT 1994 and the GATT 1947, the
GATT 1947, its waivers, and its decisions, are to control.27 The GATT
1994 amends, modifies, and expands many existing GATT obligations
through new agreements including Agreements on Agriculture, Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers
to Trade, Trade-Related Investment Measures, Agreements on the Im-
plementation of Article VI (antidumping) and on Article VII, Agree-
ments on Preshipment Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing
Procedures, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Safeguards.28
The Final Act, in the remaining annexes to the WTO Agreement, also
expands obligations of the WTO Members beyond those of the GATT
Contracting Parties to encompass new agreements on financial services
29
through the GATS accord, intellectual property rights in the TRIPs
Agreement, dispute resolution under the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, and national trade policy review through the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. All of these agreements, excluding the original GATT, but
including the GATT, are called the Multilateral Trade Agreements and
24. The GATT 1994 consists of the Understandings and Agreements of Annex IA of the
Final Act.
25. Incorporated into the GATT 1994 is the original General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade of October 30, 1947 (GATT 1947) annexed to the Final Act of the Second Session of
the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. The
GATT 1994 specifically excludes the Protocol of Provisional Application, but includes the
protocols and certifications to tariff concessions, protocols to accession, the listed waivers
granted under Article XXV of the GATT 1947 granted before the date the WTO Agreement
enters into force, and other decisions of the Contracting Parties of the GATT 1947. Final Act,
supra note 8, Part II, ann. IA, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1154-55.
26. Id. Part II, art. II, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
27. Id. Part II, ann. IA, 33 I.L.M. at 1154.
28. See id. at 1153. The GATT 1994 also embraces several Understandings on the Inter-
pretation of arts. II, para. 1(b), XVII, XVIV, and XXVII of the GATT 1994 as well as Under-
standings on Balance-of-Payment Provisions and in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under
the GATT 1994. Id. at 1156-65.
29. For specific obligations, limitations, and exceptions, see id., Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services, 33 I.L.M. at 1260.
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are binding upon all WTO Members. 30 The Final Act includes four
Plurilateral Trade Agreements covering Trade in Civil Aircraft, Govern-
ment Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the Arrange-
ment Regarding Bovine Meat,31 which are binding upon only those
WTO Members which have accepted them. 32 Consequently, with refer-
ence to the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which comprise all of the
results of the Final Act minus the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, the
problem in previous rounds of a "GATT A la Carte, '33 which allowed
Contracting Parties to pick and choose which obligations they were
bound by and which they were not, is largely avoided.
B. The WTO Agreement
The World Trade Organization is a creation of the WTO Agreement,
the purpose of which is to provide the "common institutional frame-
work" for the Covered Agreements of the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round.34 Thus, all the agreements of the Uruguay Round including the
GATT 1994 are placed under the auspices of the WTO.35
As discussed in the introduction, the ITO was to be one of three
international organizations of the Bretton Woods System accompanying
the IMF and the World Bank in the creation of the new "World Order"
for international economic relations. At the center of the Bretton Woods
System was to be the ITO, the executive organ provided in the multi-
lateral economic agreements of the Havana Charter. Had it been created,
the ITO would have administered the Charter agreements and governed
disputes arising out of the Charter's wide range of obligations.
The original idea was for the IMF, World Bank, and the ITO to
support one another in the pursuit of related goals - ultimately the
30. Id. Part II, art. II, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
31. Id. Part II, ann. 4(a)-(d).
32. Id. Part II, art. II, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
33. Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 197.
34. The covered agreements of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round include the Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements. The Multilateral Trade Agreements are: the GATT 1994, which
includes with certain exceptions the GAIT 1947; its subsequent agreements and many of its
decisions and waivers; the GATS Agreement; the TRIPs Agreement; the Dispute Settlement
Understanding; and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism [hereinafter occasionally referred to
collectively as the Multilateral Agreements]. See id. Part II, ann. IA, IB, IC, 2, and 3, 33
I.L.M. at 1154-1247. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements are the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft, the Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and
the International Bovine Meat Agreement [hereinafter the Plurilateral Trade Agreements]. Id.
ann. 4.
35. Id. Part II, art. II, paras. 1-3, 33 I.L.M. at 1144. Also, the GATT 1994 is established
within the WTO as an agreement legally distinct from the GATT 1947. Id. para. 4. Both
agreements, as mentioned above, are now administered under the auspices of the WTO and
the WTO Agreement.
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"restoration of a freer trading system. 36 The type of support imagined
was coordinated cooperation between the three organizations on the
resolution of specific problems. For instance, at the time it was foreseen
that the IMF, with the assistance of the ITO through the enforcement of
Havana Charter obligations of quantitative restrictions on trade, could
better serve and encourage governments to stabilize their currencies, and
exchange rates. It had been suggested that the very effectiveness of each
organization depended upon the other. Likewise the World Bank was to
be supported by the ITO.37
Among the responsibilities of the WTO, on the other hand, are the
tasks to facilitate the implementation, administration, operation, and
further objectives of the agreements,3 8 provide for future negotiations
concerning the Agreements, resolve disputes, review trade policy, and:
[w]ith a view to achieving greater coherence in global policy-
making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Recon-
39struction and Development ....
Thus, after almost half a century, an organization, similar to the ITO but
not the same, is brought back. This entity may fulfill Cordell Hull's old
dream of "a comprehensive code to govern the conduct of world trade"
4
and in important ways may not.4' For instance, the IMF and the World
Bank are perceived as being more effective in the realization of policy
goals within individual countries in part because of their executive
powers, which the GATT's successor, the WTO, does not yet possess.
Due to the nature and subject matter of their work dealing with cur-
rencies and grants of financial assistance, these organizations hold a
persuasive power that the GATT does not. Also, the "weighted" voting
system gives financially stronger nations more power over the decision-
making process than they have in the GATT or in the WTO. Coopera-
tion between the three in the future would certainly be beneficial to the
WTO, where the power of the other two organizations could be brought
to bear upon wayward Member Nations. However, the Dispute Settle-
36. WiLcox, supra note 5, at 211.
37. Id. at 212.
38. This includes the WTO Agreement, the GAIT 1994, which includes the Multilateral
Agreements and the Plurilateral Agreements, and the GAIT 1947.
39. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. III, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
40. GARDNER, supra note 6, at 101.
41. See Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. III, paras. 1-5, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
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ment Understanding and the use of retaliation and cross retaliation are
intended to be the primary instruments of WTO obligation enforcement,
an arguably more effective procedure than that offered by the ITO
itself.42 Nevertheless, the WTO presently lacks executive authority to
bring actions on its own initiative against its Member Nations. The
question also remains whether the allocation of such authority is a
necessary or even a desirable development for the world trading body.
C. Scope, Functions, and Structure of the WTO
The ambitious plan of the WTO is to' encourage world economic
and political convergence through comprehensive trade policy surveil-
lance and integrated dispute settlement systems, developmental assis-
tance to less developed nations, and environmental protection. Its task
will be "to provide the common institutional framework for the conduct
of trade'relations among its Members" in relation to the Uruguay Round
Agreements.43 In addition, the organization's function is to facilitate the
implementation, administration, operation, and further objectives of the
WTO Agreement and Covered Agreements, such as providing a forum
for the development and negotiation of further agreements on trade and
international economic relations.
1. Scope of the WTO
The WTO is to inherit the mantle of world trade relations, negotia-
tions, and dispute resolution which has been embodied in the GATT for
the last forty-seven years. It is to provide the "common institutional
framework" between its Members for the conduct of trade relations as
contemplated by the Covered Agreements and any further trade agree-
ments that its Members may execute. 44 The organization is to take the
place of what was to be the ITO, with all the implications for national
law that an international organization carries.45 Interestingly, the problem
presented by the Protocol of Provisional Application, namely exempting
all national laws on the books as of the adoption of the Protocol, is
avoided by its explicit exclusion from the Covered Agreements 46 and its
42. See infra section III.A.4.
43. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. 11, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
44. Id.; see also id. art. III, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
45. See infra section 11I.C. for a discussion of the effect WTO decisions may have upon
United States law.
46. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, ann. IA, para. l(a), 33 I.L.M. at 1154.
Michigan Journal of International Law
prohibition of a broad exemption for existing national law in its provi-
sions.47
2. Structure and Function of the WTO
The structure of the WTO is surprisingly similar to that proposed for
the ITO. The WTO, like the ITO, is to be a three tiered organization. At
its head rests the Ministerial Conference, which will consist of represen-
tatives of all of the WTO's Members. Next is the executive agency or
General Council. Unlike the ITO's Executive Board, the General Coun-
cil is composed of representatives of all the WTO's Members. There-
fore, it will not be a WTO "Security Council" and will not retain the
obvious advantages and disadvantages of such a body. The view is that
economically smaller nations normally apply international norms rather
fully within their domestic legal systems and are more susceptible to
pressure from economically larger nations. Accordingly, a "security
council" type feature was not needed. The WTO Agreement provides for
councils and bodies that are accountable to the General Council and/or
the Ministerial Conference.
a. The Ministerial Conference
The Ministerial Conference sits at the head of the WTO and is
charged with the execution of all of its functions and the functions it
derives from the Covered Agreements. It has authority to make any
decisions necessary to the fulfillment of these functions. It also has
authority to make decisions in accordance with the decisionmaking
procedure for all appropriate matters put before it by request of a Mem-
ber concerning the Covered Agreements. It is to establish certain com-
mittees on Trade and Development, on Balance of Payment Restrictions,
and on Budget, Finance, and Administration, and to grant those commit-
tees appropriate authority in order that they may carry out the functions
of the Covered Agreements. The Ministerial Conference is to meet
biannually. In recess, the functions of the Ministerial Conference are to
be performed by the General Council.
47. A small exemption is allowed for "specific mandatory legislation, enacted by [a]
Member before it became a contracting party to GATT 1947, that prohibits the use, sale or
lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between
points in national waters or the waters of an exclusive economic zone." Id. para. 3(a), 33
I.L.M. at 1155. This exemption seems to apply only to the construction of vessels used in
international shipping by water. Specifically, it was required by the United States so as to
preserve certain provisions of the Jones Act.
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b. The General Council
Certain executive authority and day to day functions of the WTO
will rest with the General Council. It will also be composed of represen-
tatives of all the WTO's Members and is charged to meet as appropriate
in intervals between the biannual meetings of the Conference to perform
the Conference's functions. Under the authority of the General Council
rest the heart and soul of the WTO organization: the Dispute Settlement
Body, the Trade Policy Review Body, and the various councils and
committees, including Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services,
and TRIPs.
(i) The Councils
Membership in the councils is open to representatives of all Mem-
bers which will meet when necessary to carry out the councils' func-
tions. The councils are granted authority to create subordinate organiza-
tions and to establish rules of procedure for themselves and their subor-
dinates. The Councils and their subsidiaries will operate under the
guidance of the General Council.
(ii) The DSB and TPRB
Responsibility for resolution of disputes resides with the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).48 The specifics of dispute settlement are dis-
cussed at length in Part III. The DSB is simply a special meeting of the
General Council in its dispute settlement role and is composed of all
General Council Members present at the DSB meeting. The DSB shall
have a Chairman at its head and shall establish its own rules of proce-
dure.49
48. Id. Part II, art. IV, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. In the Uruguay Round Final Draft
completed on December 15, 1993, both the WTO Agreement and the DSU only refer to the
actual creation of the DSB; each agreement assumes the other created the DSB. As with any'
agreement of such length and scope, there are bound to be a few oversights. The WTO
Agreement refers to the DSB twice and the Dispute Settlement Understanding once. The
WTO Agreement states: "The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the
responsibilities of the [DSB] provided for in the [DSU]." Draft Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Part II, art. IV, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 16
(emphasis added). The DSU refers to "[tihe [DSB] established pursuant to the [WTO Agree-
ment] . I... "d  ann. 2, para 2, 33 I.L.M. at 114 (emphasis added). Thus, nowhere is the DSB
technically created under the Covered Agreements. In the Final Act, the drafters resolved the
oversight by stating explicitly that the DSB "is hereby established .... Final Act, supra
note 8, Part II, ann. 2, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing].
49. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. IV, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
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3. Functions of Specific Organs Within the WTO
As previously stated, the functions of the WTO are to facilitate the
implementation, administration, and operation of the Covered Agreements;
to provide a forum for negotiations between its Members; to settle disputes
arising under the Covered Agreements; to administer the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism; and to cooperate with the IMF and World Bank for
the purpose of achieving "greater coherence in global economic policy-
making."5° The WTO will provide for negotiations over issues arising
under the Covered Agreements, for "further negotiations among its
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework
for the implementation of the results of such negotiations. ... 51This last
provision allows for the expansion of its mandate and further evolution
of the international system of economic and trade cooperation and dispute
resolution found in the Covered Agreements to include new multilateral
agreements between its Members.
a. Ministerial Conference and the General Council
Specifically, the Ministerial Conference is to be composed of repre-
sentatives of each Member of its Charter and embodies the ultimate power
and decisionmaking organ of the WTO. The Ministerial Conference and
the General Council possess authority to adopt interpretations of the
Covered Agreements. 2 The Ministerial Conference alone possesses the
power to authorize new multilateral negotiations between the WTO's
membership and adopt the results of those negotiations. In "exceptional
circumstances" and with a three-fourths majority vote of the Member
Nations, the Ministerial Conference alone may grant waivers to Members
from their obligations under those agreements.53
Generally, Article IX provides that the practice of consensus deci-
sionmaking as established under the GATT 1947 will continue in the
WTO,54 but decisions of the Ministerial Conference and General Coun-
cil, mainly on procedural questions, shall be taken by majority vote,
unless otherwise provided.55 A decision by consensus is made where no
50. id. art. III, paras. 1-5, 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
51. Id. para. 2.
52. Id. art. IX, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1148.
53. Id. para. 3.
54. Id. para. 1.
55. Id.
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Member present formally objects to the proposed decision. 56 Presum-
ably, consensus decisionmaking applies mainly and most importantly to
new negotiations under the auspices of the Covered Agreements or
negotiations for new multilateral agreements between the WTO Mem-
bers. A form of inverted consensus decisionmaking is explicitly provid-
ed in cases where the General Council operates as the DSB.
(i) Article IX: Decisionmaking
The formulation of the first paragraph of Article IX is perhaps a bit
confusing. Article IX, paragraph 1, provides:
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by con-
sensus followed under the GATT 1947. Except as otherwise pro-
vided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the
matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At meetings of the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of
the WTO shall have one vote. Where the European Communities
exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes equal
to the number of their Member States which are Members of the
WTO. Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless
otherwise provided in this Agreement or the Multilateral Agree-
ments.
First, the paragraph provides that the WTO "shall continue the practice
of decisionmaking by consensus followed under the GATT 1947" unless
and "except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived
at by consensus" the decision is to be made "by voting." The provision
further states that decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the Gener-
al Council, unless otherwise provided, "shall be taken by a majority of
the votes cast." Accordingly, decisions will be made by voting in two
cases: (1) where a decision normally to be made by consensus cannot
thus be made, excepting, of course, decisions of the General Council in
its role as DSB;57 and (2) in decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council, "except as otherwise provided," that is, in deci-
sions such as those on waivers, interpretations, and amendments.
58
56. Id. Part II, 33 I.L.M. at 1148 n.l.
57. Id. n.3; Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 2, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at
1227.
58. Amendments of the Multilateral Trade Agreements normally require consensus to be
adopted, but where a decision on an amendment cannot be reached by consensus, then it will
be taken by a vote equalling two-thirds of the Members. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art.
X, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1149.
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Consequently, it is not initially clear from the text whether a general
principle of consensus decisionmaking or decisionmaking by voting is to
be established in reference to the Ministerial Conference and General
Council. Presumably, decisions on procedural matters within the Minis-
terial Conference and the General Council are to be made by majority
vote. Decisions such as the approval of Committee and Council rules
and procedures would be one example of such procedural matters.
There remain, nevertheless, uncertainties even where this explana-
tion holds true. Consensus is established as the general rule for decision-
making on substantive decisions of the WTO. In cases where the deci-
sion cannot be reached by consensus, an impasse rule applies, and the
decision is then to be made by voting. It is clear that where "otherwise
provided," as in special provisions for waivers, interpretations, and
amendments, those special provisions apply and not the general rule of
consensus. These decisions were singled out for special attention be-
cause of their importance. Other decisions, arguably of equal impor-
tance, nevertheless have no specific rule and apparently fall within the
general rule for consensus decisionmaking to which the impasse rule
applies. Accordingly, where a decision on these matters cannot be
reached by consensus, the issue will be decided by voting. One such
circumstance appears to be the decision on whether to "continue, modify
or terminate" the new dispute settlement procedure.59 Where the Mini-
sterial Conference cannot decide to continue, modify, or terminate the
dispute settlement procedure by consensus, it would then make the
decision by voting. Would such decisions to modify the procedure be
allowed to go so far as to amend or interpret the DSU? The DSU ap-
pears amendable only under Article X, paragraph 8, but that provision is
silent as to whether it controls in this specific circumstance. The "im-
passe rule" which allows for voting where consensus fails appears
equally applicable to Article X, paragraph 8. Moreover, the impasse rule
for consensus decisionmaking does not define the term "by voting."
Whether simple majority, two-thirds, three-fourths, or even unanimous
margins is meant is left unclear.
(ii) Interpretations, Amendments, and Waivers
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council have exclusive
authority to rule upon an interpretation or waiver granted in regard to
59. Final Act, supra note 8, part III, Decision on the Application and Review of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. at
1261.
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the Covered Agreements. The grant of waivers is solely within the
competence of the Ministerial Conference. Adoption of amendments is
also exclusively within the province of the Ministerial Council but may
be recommended by any Member or any Council created under the
auspices of the Multilateral Trade Agreements by the Ministerial Con-
ference or the General Council.6° Amendments of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements normally require consensus to be adopted, but where a
decision on an amendment cannot be reached by consensus, in certain
instances it will be made by a vote equalling two-thirds of the Mem-
bers.6'
(iii) The Councils and Committees
Virtually every agreement, or set of agreements, has its own specific
council or committee charged with Ministerial Conference or General
Council type powers and is under the direction of the Ministerial Con-
ference or General Council to administer that agreement. The Councils
for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights are created directly by the WTO Agreement,
while Committees on Trade and Development, on Balance-of-Payment
Restrictions, and on Budget, Finance, and Administration (the Commit-
tees) are to be established by the Ministerial Conference. Other commit-
tees, such as the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, are
established by particular agreements.62 Its functions will be assigned to it
by its Members and by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM). A further function of the Committee on SCM is to
establish the Permanent Group of Experts, which plays a pivotal role in
panel decisions under the dispute settlement process for disputes arising
out of the Agreement on SCM.
63
Generally speaking, the councils and committees are to draft rules
and procedures to be approved by the General Council or the Ministerial
Conference, whichever the case may be. The General Council is empow-
ered to create any additional committees it deems necessary and may
assign to existing or new committees any additional functions it sees fit.
60. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. X, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1149. A list of those
Councils which may recommend amendments may be found at Annex I to the Multilateral
Trade Agreements. Id. art. IV, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1146.
61. Id. art. X, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1149.
62. Subsidies Code Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the GATr, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 24, para. 1, 31- U.S.T. 513, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204
[hereinafter Subsidies Agreement].
63. Id. para. 3.
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(iv) The DSB and TPRB
The DSB is the central character in the dispute resolution drama,
and its role is performed by the General Council. The dispute settlement
procedure of the WTO differs somewhat from agreement to agreement,
but the essentials of all agreements can be boiled down to the following
stages: consultation, panel investigation and report, appellate review,
decision adoption, and implementation. A parallel procedure for binding
arbitration is also available where both or all parties to a dispute agree
to the procedure. Also, during the implementation phase of a decision,
the party against whom a decision is implemented may request arbitra-
tion as of right to determine whether the retaliatory measure to be
implemented is appropriate to the circumstance. In the instance of a
dispute concerning the Covered Agreements, the parties may call for
consultation, 64 at which time the DSB mechanism is not yet activated.
Where consultations fail to produce a mutually satisfactory solution, the
DSB decides by reverse or inverted consensus65 whether to convene a
panel or adopt a decision. That is, panel or Appellate Body establish-
ment or decision adoption is achieved automatically unless the Members
present at the particular meeting of the DSB decide by consensus not to
do so.66 The panel, if convened, will investigate the matter and submit a
report to the DSB authorizing appropriate action, if any. The report must
be adopted by the DSB unless rejected by consensus and without
amendment, or in the alternative it may be appealed by either or any
party to the dispute to the Appellate Body. Only a party to the dispute
may appeal the report to the Appellate Body. An Appellate Body deci-
sion shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties unless the DSB
vetoes it by consensus, therefore making its rejection difficult or impos-
sible where at least one WTO Member present at the meeting of the
DSB at which the decision for adoption is to be made desires adoption
of the report.
As discussed at length in Part IV, the DSU and the WTO Agree-
ment provide for a mixture of adjudication and negotiation, a mixture
which moves more strongly in the direction of adjudication than the
system that evolved under the GATT. Apparently, the DSB is composed
of the Members to the General Council present at its meeting, and the
64. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-29. A
thorough discussion of Consultation is discussed infra section II.A. 1.
65. Id. art. 2, para. 4, n.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
66. Id. arts. 6-16, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-35. Composition, powers, procedures, investigative
authority, and adoption of reports are discussed infra section III.
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General Council is composed of representatives of all WTO Members.
But Panels and Appellate Bodies will be more independent from the in-
fluence of disputing parties than ever before. Panels may be composed
of nongovernmental individuals whose reports must be adopted or
rejected without amendment, somewhat shielding the actual formulation
of the decision from political interest. It should be noted that the panel
may also be Composed of governmental officials or a combination
thereof, but there is a stated preference against citizens of parties to a
dispute sitting on a panel in that dispute. Furthermore, panelists are to
be chosen with a view toward ensuring their independence. 67 Also, at the
Appellate level, adjudication finds a stronger foothold with Appellate
"judges" appointed by the DSB for fixed terms of four years, subject to
one reappointment. 68 Appellate decisions may be rejected only by a
"consensus veto" of the DSB, assuring adoption in every case where at
least one Member favors adoption of the decision.69
The ITO, on the other hand, provided a rather different dispute
settlement approach. The procedure consisted of similar phases: consul-
tation, Executive Board investigation and decision, arbitration, disposi-
tion by the Conference, and, finally, legal issues could be referred to the
World Court for a binding determination. Disposition by the Conference,
if requested by a party to the dispute, or by the Executive Board where
referral to the Conference did not occur, was to be final as to the eco-
nomic and factual issues of the dispute.70 The DSB improves upon the
process of decision adoption found in theITO, wheie the Conference or
Executive Board were to approve settlement decisions by majority vote
67. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 8; paras. 1-3, 33 I.L.M at
1231. The DSU provides at this juncture:
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmen-
tal individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a
panel, served as a representative of an [W]TO Member or of a contracting party to
the GATT 1947 or as a representative to a council or committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published
on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a
Member.
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of
the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.
3. Citizens of Members whose governments are parties to the dispute or third
parties as defined in 10.2 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute
unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
Id.
68. Id. art. 17, paras. 1 and 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
69. Id. para. 14, 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
70. Havana Charter, supra note 7, ch. VII, art. 95, para. 1.
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rather than adopt them automatically if not vetoed by consensus as
provided in the DSB. Also, the Security Council quality of the Execu-
tive Board not only limited the number of parties who could vote to
settle a dispute, but also would have opened the door to political in-
fluence or criticisms of bullying by the permanent Members of the
Board. Nothing like the Appellate Body was contemplated within the
ITO. Its development is perhaps a further significant step forward for
adjudication in trade disputes.
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) was originally creat-
ed in 1989" during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The purpose of the
Mechanism is to improve adherence of WTO Members to obligations
under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, under
the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. It is also intended to achieve greater
transparency in the trade policies and practices of WTO Members. The
Review Mechanism provides for a Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB)
which reviews country policy on the basis of Member submitted "Coun-
try Reports" and WTO Secretariat reports. The TPRB will not have
authority to impose new policy commitments upon countries, nor may it
enforce specific obligations under the Covered Agreements for dispute
settlement procedures or otherwise. TPRB authority extends to a review
of national policy and practice on the basis of Member and Secretariat
reports and the making of a final report which is then submitted to the
Ministerial Conference. On the basis of the TPRB report, the Ministerial
Conference will "evaluate" individual Member's trade policies and
practices. A further function of the TPRB is an annual review of devel-
opments in the "international trading environment." This report is to
consider developments and policy issues affecting the multilateral trad-
ing system.
Using the TPRM and TPRB as trade police to effect compliance
with international obligations in national trade policy is far from reality
and, according to at least some commentators, is not a desirable objec-
tive. At present, political sentiment, especially in the United States, is
barely, if at all, tolerant of the rather meager allocation of national
sovereignty in the WTO and the Covered Agreements. As the WTO and
its various subsidiary organs and committees establish a track record of
dependability, especially in relation to dispute settlement, perhaps opin-
ion will change in favor of more international control of national trade
policy.
71. Functioning of the GATT" System, Decisions of 12 April 1989 arising from action
taken by the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee UJ6490, 36 B.I.S.D. 403 (1990).
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D. The World Trade Organization: Conclusions
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has heretofore
governed issues related to international trade between its contracting
parties, is soon to be superseded by the World Trade Organization. The
WTO has been described as the crowning achievement of the Uruguay
Round. It was designed as a "minimalist" organization12 to facilitate
international cooperation on trade and economic relations.73 The WTO is
entirely institutional and procedural in character and plays the essential
role of unifying the existing and new obligations under one administra-
tive roof. In addition, it provides an internationally recognized organiza-
tional structure which its forerunner, the GATT, had lacked. The new
obligations under the GATS and TRIPs Agreements, as well as the
modified GATT commitments, find a common institutional home in the
new World Trade Organization. The administration of the agreements on
trade in goods in the GATT 1994 and the new multilateral obligations
beyond the scope of trade in goods are to be the work of the WTO, a
role the GATT could have fulfilled only with great difficulty consider-
ing that its competence extended only to tariffs and trade in goods.
GATT achieved remarkable success in its forty-seven year history.
Nevertheless, time and experience exposed certain limitations resulting
from the lack of an institutional charter and GATT's provisional ap-
plication. Several defects had been pointed out within the GATT regime
which needed remedy if the multilateral trading system was to function
more effectively. Singled out as particularly vexatious were GATT's
provisional application and grandfather rights exceptions, ambiguity
about waiver authority and the powers of the Contracting Parties to
make certain decisions, the murky legal status of the GATT as an
international institution, problems with dispute settlement, and a lack of
constitutional provisions in GATT which have led to the need for con-
stant improvisation.74
Accordingly, the WTO provides a unified administrative organ for
all of the Uruguay Round Agreements and overcomes two initial prob-
lems. First, the establishment of the WTO resolves the difficulty of
incorporating the non-trade-in-goods obligations concerning the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights and trade in services into the GATT.
72. Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 197.
73. See id.
74. Id.; see also Petersmann, supra note 11, at 221-44; JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE
GATr, supra note 11, at 91-103; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at
299-308; Low, supra note 12, at 242-52.
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The creation of a unified organ "separates the institutional concepts
from the institutional rules."" Second, the establishment of the WTO
settles the question of the institutional status of the trade entity, a ques-
tion which has hindered GATT in its nearly five decades of history.
Further, the agreements to be administered by the WTO are incor-
porated into the WTO Agreement as Annexes. Importantly, the Protocol
of Provisional Application is excepted from these agreements. Because
the new Members of the WTO will, in effect, withdraw from the old
GATT and become members of the new GATT 1994 minus the Proto-
col, the old problem of provisional application is solved. Under Article
XVI, paragraph 4, of the WTO Agreement, Members may now be
obligated under international law to bring existing national law into
conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreement obligations.76 The
provision requires all WTO Members to conform their national "laws,
regulations and administrative procedures" to the obligations provided in
the Uruguay Round Agreements.
77
As to decisionmaking, dispute settlement is technically removed
from the decisionmaking process of the Members and placed within the
DSB, where panel and Appellate Body reports are automatically adopted
unless rejected by consensus. Consensus is preserved as the basic form
of Member decisionmaking except that an impasse rule is created. In
cases where the Members fail to reach a decision based on consensus,
the matter is to be decided by voting unless otherwise provided. Deci-
sions are reached "by voting," generally, in two cases: (1) where con-
sensus leads to impasse and the decision is not excepted from the im-
passe rule, such as decisions of the General Council in its role as DSB;78
and (2) in procedural decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council. Decisions on waivers, amendments, and interpretations
have special rules of their own. These rules require a three-fourths
majority vote for waivers, consensus for amendments 79 except in certain
75. Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 197.
76. The WTO Agreement provides that "[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements." Final Act,'supra note 8, Part II, art. XVI, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1152.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. IX, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1148 and n.3; Dispute Settlement Understanding,
supra note 48, art. 2, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
79. See, e.g., Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. IX, 33 I.L.M. at 1148; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Agreement), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art.
II, para. 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The GATS art. II and TRIPs Agreement art. 4 take effect only
upon acceptance of all Members. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. X, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at
1149.
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circumstances where consensus fails, and three-fourths vote for inter-
pretations.
There are certain difficulties in the decisionmaking articles of the
WTO Agreement. Generally, consensus decisionmaking applies to
substantive decisions of the WTO, but in specific circumstances, it is
clear that special provisions contrary to the general rule of consensus for
decisions on waivers, interpretations, and amendments derogate that rule.
These decisions were singled out for special treatment because of their
importance, while certain decisions of arguably equal importance, never-
theless, have no specific rule and apparently fall within the general rule
for consensus decisionmaking to which the impasse rule applies. Ac-
cordingly, where a decision on these matters cannot be reached by
consensus, the issue will be decided "by voting." It is unclear whether
the impasse rule allowing voting on certain decisions applies to renewal
or modification of the dispute settlement procedure. The exact meaning
of the phrase "by voting" is also unclear.80
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Dispute Settlement Understanding presents a significant im-
provement over the previous GATT dispute resolution system and solves
many of its shortcomings. There are three main improvements to the
system. First, the DSU creates a "unified" dispute settlement system,
which overcomes the problem of. uncertainty in determining which
procedure should apply. Second, it establishes a new organ, the Ap-
pellate Body, for review of legal issues decided by panels. Third, the
new system virtually ensures the establishment of panels and Appellate
Bodies and adoption of their decisions unmodified through a type of
reverse or inverted consensus.8'
The central provisions for GATT dispute settlement are found at
Articles XXII and XXIII. But as there is no general definition provided
in GATT determining exactly what constitutes a dispute under its aus-
pices, one may point to perhaps more than thirty separate provisions for
multilateral or bilateral consultations which are arguably dispute resolu-
tion procedures. 82 Beyond GATT law, other international agreements
80. See supra section I.C.3.a.ii.; see also Final Act, supra note 8, Part III, Decision on
the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M at 1260-1261.
81. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 199.
82. Jackson identified 22 such provisions. He lists GATT articles and paragraphs as
follows: II, para. 5; VI, para. 7; VII, para. 1; VIII, para. 2; IX, para. 6; XII, para. 4; XIII,
para. 4; XVI, para. 4; XVIII, para, 7; XVIII, para. 12; XVIII, para. 16; XVIII, para. 21;
XVIII, para. 22; XIX, para, 2; XXII; XXIII; XXIV, para. 7; XXV, para. 1; XXVII; XXVIII,
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provide possibly competing venues and procedures for the settlement of
disputes, such as the NAFTA Agreement,83 which is multilateral in
nature, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation be-
tween the United States and Germany, which is bilateral and is also an
independent source of rules for dispute settlement.84
The corollary to dispute resolution is interpretation. Without a
dispute, real or potential, as to the obligations, concessions, or benefits
accruing under a treaty, there would be no need for interpretation.
Without an interpretation as to exactly what and how the parties in-
tended to bind themselves, there will be no dispute resolution. Unfor-
tunately, just as there is no definition of dispute provided in the GATT,
there is also no explicit grant allowing for formal binding interpretation
in any of the pre-Uruguay Round GATT agreements, although as we
para. 1; XXVIX, para. 4; XXXVII, para. 2. LAW OF GATT, supra note 8, at 164-65.
Petersmann identifies 30. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Improvements in the
GATT Dispute Settlement System, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 340, 340-42 (Detlev Chr. Dicke & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
1988) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NIEO].
Professor Mora points to more than thirty articles covering dispute settlement when
employing the definition of dispute proffered by the Permanent Court of International Justice:
"a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between
two persons." Mavrommattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. 1 (ser. A)
No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30); Mora, supra note 10, at 115.
83. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. 605, 693
[hereinafter NAFTA].
84. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, art. XXVII U.S.-
F.R.G., 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1867. See Carsten T. Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., Gaining the
Competitive Edge: Access to the European Market Through Bilateral Commercial Treaties
and Taxation Strategies, 28 TEX. INT'L L. J. 269, 305-06 (1993); Carsten T. Ebenroth,
Gaining Access to Fortress Europe-Recognition of U.S. Corporations in Germany and the
Revision of the Seat Rule, 24 INT'L LAW. 459, 482 (1990). According to art. 113 of the EC
Treaty, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, like the treaty between the U.S.
and Germany, are integrated into the common commercial policy of the European Union.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 113 [hereinafter EC TREATY]; see
also CHRISTIAN VEDDER, DIE AUSWARTIGE GEWALT DES EUROPA DER NEUN 22 (1980);
Carsten T. Ebenroth, Ausldndische Investitionen und EG Integration, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
KARL REBMANN (Heinz Eyrich et al. eds., 1989). Art. 234 of the EC Treaty, while stating that
previous bilateral treaties are not to be affected, requires all provisions in bilateral treaties that
conflict with the Treaty establishing the European Community to be eliminated. EC TREATY
art. 234. Furthermore, the EU Commission agreed to prolong the effectiveness of certain
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties in 1987. This agreement to prolong effective-
ness lasted only until the end of 1988, at which time no further action was taken.
Regardless of the EC Commission's failure to prolong further the effectiveness of the
treaties, there is no effect on the sovereign right of member nations to conclude or adhere to
such agreements under international law. IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, DAS RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN ORGANIZATIONEN EINSCHLIESSLICH DER SUPRANATIONALEN GEMEIN-
SCHAFTEN 269 (4th ed. 1984).
Also, the past practice of the European Commission's extension of treaties, coupled with
the point that the FCN Treaty contains provisions not contemplated within the jurisdiction of
the EU, confirms its continuing validity.
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shall see in some specific circumstances, binding "interpretations" of
several articles of the original GATT have been agreed upon in the
Uruguay Round final agreement. 85
In the absence of a provision for a formal interpretation procedure,
one must resort to international principles of treaty interpretation. The
primary treaty source for the interpretation of international agreements is
the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties. 6 According to
the principles of treaty interpretation, some of which are set out in the
Vienna Convention, interpretation is to be guided by the ordinary and
natural meaning of the words in the agreement, previous and subsequent
agreements, subsequent practice, and relevant rules of international
law.87 These principles have been applied to the interpretation of GATT.
In addition, subsequent agreements to GATT such as the Tokyo Round
agreements and the Uruguay Round agreements have attempted to
interpret certain provisions and articles of the original agreement. De-
spite the assertion in many of these subsequent provisions that they
merely interpret the original agreement, commentators claim that the
subsequent rounds actually erected new obligations and concessions.88
A. Dispute Settlement Under the Auspices of the WTO
The new dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO presents some
promising and perhaps radical innovations over the GATT system,
although not without some loopholes. The new system can be divided
into four basic phases: consultation, a panel phase, Appellate Body
review, and finally, as an optional alternative procedure, arbitration. As
stated above, the Dispute Settlement Understanding improves upon the
previous GATT dispute resolution system in three major areas. First, the
DSU creates a "unified" dispute settlement system which overcomes the
problem of uncertainty in determining which procedure should apply.
Second, it establishes a new organ, the Appellate Body, for review of
85. Several "Understanding[s] on the Interpretation of" Articles II, para. l(b), XVII,
XXIV, XXV, XXVIII, and XXXV are included in the GATT 1994.
86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Interpretation of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
87. The orthodox view shunned the use of "rules" for the purpose of treaty interpretation,
preferring instead a quest for the original intention of the parties to the agreement, not unlike
the inquiry in national contract laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Part Ill, at 147 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
Several principles of interpretation employed usefully in that analysis were rules of liberal
construction and effectiveness, and the ejusdem generis and expressio unius exclusio alteris
doctrines (general and special words). For an informative and eloquent discussion of these
principles, see chs. XXI-XXIX of ARNOLD B. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES (1961).
88. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 56-57.
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legal issues decided by panels. Third, the new system virtually ensures the
establishment of panels and Appellate Bodies and unmodified adoption
of their decisions through a type of reverse or inverted consensus.89 Under
the new system, a complaining party will have several potential remedies.
First, the respondent party's measures that are found to be in violation
may be brought into conformity. Second, where the respondent party does
not bring its measures into conformity, the complaining party may receive
compensation from the respondent party for the injury caused. Third,
where the parties to the dispute fail to reach agreement on compensation,
the complaining party may either retaliate against the respondent within
the same sector and agreement under which the respondent has been found
to be in violation, or, if the complaining party believes retaliation to be
insufficient, it may seek authorization to retaliate across sectors and
agreements against the respondent party. A further and significant
modification is the division between panel and appellate phases, which
resembles a legal' tribunal of first instance and appeal.- The new system
is the most detailed dispute resolution mechanism in GATT's history and
rivals that of the ITO. The system, first proposed in the'Dunkel Draft
Dispute Settlement Understanding,' is intended as a unified system
somewhat modified through special procedures in individual agreements.
9'
Unlike national judicial systems with the power of the executive at
its disposal to enforce directly its judgements, the new system must still
rely upon less effective and more indirect means to enforce its decisions,
such as suspension of concessions and obligations under the Covered
Agreements (i.e., higher tariffs, quotas, countervailing duties, or other
restrictions on trade). The new system contains no mechanism for direct
enforcement, which would require some radical adjustment or forfeiture
of national sovereignty. Several commentators have suggested, however,
that the new system is the most effective and judicial-type approach for
the indirect enforcement and regulation of international trade yet pro-
posed, specifically with respect to cross retaliation. Cross retaliation
does have its detractors, however. Some argue that retaliation will
rarely, if ever, be used. They point out that retaliation was available
under the GATT dispute settlement system from its beginnings and was
89. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 2, at 199-200.
90. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 20, 1991, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes Under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[hereinafter Draft DSU], GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (1991) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft].
91. For a detailed discussion of the special dispute settlement procedures see New
Multilateral Trading System, supra note 21, at 288-97.
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imposed only once, with less than satisfactory results, in the U.S. Dairy
Quotas Case.'
The DSU provides the basic framework for the settlement of dis-
putes under the Covered Agreements. 93 Despite the history and
controversial nature of trade disputes, the DSU declares that the
utilization of the conciliation and dispute settlement procedures are not
to be "intended or considered as contentious acts . . . ."' Consequently,
use of the system as a means to promote individual national trade
interests to the detriment of the system is, perhaps, impliedly prohibited.
Although the understanding provides quite specific procedures for
dispute resolution, there are cases where additional or special rules for
dispute settlement are provided in the individual agreements themselves.
In those instances, the special provisions control to the extent they are
inconsistent with the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The rules and
procedures depart somewhat from the basic dictates of the DSU in the
Agreements on Anti-Dumping,96 Technical Barriers to Trade, 97 Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures,98 Customs Valuation,99 Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Regulations," ° Textiles,' °' GATS,'O° Financial Services,0 3
92. For a discussion of the U.S. Dairy Quotas Case, see HUDEC, supra note 8, at ch. 16;
see also New Multilateral Trading System, supra note 21, at 241-42.
93. Covered Agreements for this subsection include the Muljilateral Trade Agreements,
excluding the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and
the Plurilateral Agreements. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, app. 1
(Agreements Covered by the Understanding), 33 I.L.M. at 1244.
94. Id. art. 3, para. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
95. Id. art. 1, para.. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226, and app. 2 (Special or Additional Rules and
Procedures), 33 I.L.M. at 1255-45.
96. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, ann. ]A, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the GATT 1994, art. 17 and anns. 1-8. It should be noted that the exemption in Appendix
2 to the Dispute Settlement Understanding refers to the "Anti-Dumping" agreement and not to
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI. Nonetheless, it is clear that Appendix 2 is
referring to the latter.
97. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1974, art. 14, paras. 2-4 and
ann. 2, 26 B.I.S.D 8, 22-26, 31 (1980).
98. Subsidies Agreement, supra note 62, arts. 4-8, nn.3, 4, and 6 and ann. V.
99. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Customs Valuation), Apr. 12, 1979, art. 19, paras. 3-5 and ann.
11.2(f), 3, 9, and 21, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402.
100. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, ann. IA, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, para. 36, GATT Doc. MTN/FA-II-AIA-4 (Dec. 15, 1993).
101. Final Act, supra note 8, Part 11, ann. IA, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, art.
2, paras. 14 and 21; art. 4, para 4; art. 5, paias. 2, 4, and 6; art. 6, para. 9; and art. 8, paras.
1-12, GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA II-AIA-5.
102. Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, ann. 1B (General Agreement on Trade in Services),
art. XXII, para. 3 and art. XXIII, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1182-83 [hereinafter GATS Agree-
ment].
103. Id. Annex on Financial Services, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1189.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Air Transport Services,"° and the Ministerial Decision on Services Dis-
putes. 05
Some very important innovations bode well for the future of ad-
judication in the world trading system. The first of these is the creation
of a Dispute Settlement Body. The General Council, which is composed
of representatives of all the WTO Members, is the organ charged with
the administration of consultations and dispute settlement1°6 when it sits
in its capacity as the DSB.' °7 The DSB is authorized to appoint its own
chairperson and establish its own rules, t0 8 and operates on an important
inversion of the traditional GATT method of consensus decisionmaking.
This inversion is perhaps the most important advantage to dispute
resolution decisionmaking in the new system. According to the Under-
standing, "[t]he Dispute Settlement Body may be deemed to have decid-
ed by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Mem-
ber, present at the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body when the
decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision. ' 9 The
DSB must form panels and adopt panel and Appellate Body decisions
unless it decides by consensus not to do so. That is, when the DSB
proposes to decide not to form a panel or adopt a report or decision, it
will make such a decision only if "no Member present ... formally
objects to the proposed decision.""l 0 Hence, the ITO's requirement of a
simple majority to carry a settlement decision is not revived.,' This
development has already been praised by commentators." 12 Majority
vote, it is argued, would have opened the door to politicization of the
entire dispute resolution process.'
13
104. Id. Annex on Air Transport Services, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1188.
105. Final Act, supra note 8, Part III, Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures
for the GATS, paras. 1-5, 33 I.L.M. at 1254.
106. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 46, art. 2, para. 1.
107. The WTO Agreement provides that "[t]he General Council shall convene as ap-
propriate to discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding . Final Act, supra note 8, Part II, art. 4, para. 3, 33
I.L.M. at 1145.
108. Id.
109. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 46, art. 2, para. 4, n.1, 33 I.L.M. at
1227.
110. Id. and id. art. 17, paras. 1, 4, and 14, 33 I.L.M. at 1236-37.
111. See supra part I.C.3.a.iv.
112. Mora, supra note 10, at 149-50.
113. Jeffrey M. Waincymer, Revitalizing GAT) Article XXIII-Issues in the Context of
the Uruguay Round, WORLD COMPETITION, Sept. 1988, at 5, 42-43 (1988).
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Another innovation, the introduction of Appellate Body review, is
perhaps the system's most significant step toward the creation of an
international legal tribunal on trade. In concert with decisionmaking by
consensus, it radically alters the dispute settlement regime." 4 The Ap-
pellate Body is to be composed of seven elected members who are
recognized authorities with expertise in law, international trade, and the
Covered Agreements." 5 Appellate Body members are to be appointed by
the DSB for as many as two four year terms. Any three of the seven
will sit in review of panel reports, and for each particular case the
Appellate Body members are to be chosen by lot.
The introduction of arbitration as an alternative technique of dispute
resolution, perhaps yet another cross-over from the failed ITO, adds
more of a judicial flavor to WTO dispute settlement. Another positive
modification in the direction of adjudication is a new method for the
selection of panelists. In the spirit of the 1989 improvements, the DSU
reflects a distinct bias in favor of independent, noncitizen panelists.
Detailed regulations on implementation overcome one of the main
defects of the Tokyo Round changes: the delay in implementation of
panel recommendations and rulings of the Contracting Parties. 16 Finally,
specific procedures have been introduced for nonviolation complaints.
For these complaints, panels and the Appellate Body are limited in their
ruling capacity to recommend only "mutually satisfactory adjustment."
These recommendations may include compensation but may not require
the removal of national measures in conformity with the Covered Agree-
ments which nullify or impair benefits of the complaining party.
17
Before looking at the specifics of conciliation and dispute settlement
more closely, let us briefly outline the basic procedure. At the emer-
gence of a dispute, WTO Members may call for consultations. If consul-
tations fail to produce a mutually satisfactory solution, a party to the
dispute may request that the DSB establish a panel. Upon such a re-
quest, the DSB must establish the panel, unless it decides not to do so
by consensus. Any party to the dispute may appeal a panel report to the
114. See Mora, supra note 10, at 144-45. Professor Mora offers that the Appellate Body
"represents the most radical innovation introduced in GATT dispute settlement since the
generalization of the panel procedure in 1952." Id. at 144.
115. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 17, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at
1238.
116. See, e.g., JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 97; JACKSON,
RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 56-80; A. Jane Bradley, Implementing
the Results of GA7T Panel Proceedings: An Area for Uruguay Round Consideration, in NEW
GATT ROUND, supra note 12, at 345; Mora, supra note 10, at 143.
117. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 26, 33 I.L.M. at 1242-43.
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Appellate Body unless the DSB vetoes its request by consensus. Panel
reports and Appellate Body decisions are automatically adopted without
modification by the DSB at its next meeting unless rejected by con-
sensus, or in the case of panel decisions, unless they are appealed to the
Appellate Body. In the alternative, if both parties agree, they may seek
to resolve their dispute through arbitration. There appears to be no
appeal from arbitration, which is characterized as "binding.""' Even if
binding, however, WTO arbitration may have a certain disadvantage." 9
The arbitration provision does not clarify whether a party may pull out
of the process once arbitration has begun but before a binding award is
handed down. Such a clarification in subsequent practice will help to
evaluate the procedure's effectiveness. If a party would be able to
withdraw during an arbitration proceeding, the remaining party would
presumably be able to call for consultations, panel establishment, and
Appellate Body review where necessary. It is also unclear whether a
party may pursue its dispute through the dispute settlement procedure in
the DSB on the same or similar issue settled in arbitration after arbitra-
tion is completed.
Members may bring "cases"'120 against other Members for instances
of violation and nonviolation nullification and impairment. A prima
facie case of nullification and impairment arises where a Member in-
fringes on its "obligations assumed under a covered agreement.'' Such
an infringement creates a presumption against the infringing Member,
who must then rebut the charge that the breaching measure has had an
adverse effect on the complaining Member. 22 The expressed aim of the
dispute settlement rules and procedures is to secure a positive solution
to those disputes. The preferred resolutions are, understandably, mutual-
ly satisfactory solutions rather than decisions. 23 If a mutually satisfac-
tory solution cannot be reached and a panel or appellate body has estab-
lished that the infringing measure is "inconsistent with the provisions of
any of the covered agreements," several options are available. First, the
infringing measure may be removed. Second, where the removal is
118. The Dispute Settlement provides in relevant part: "The parties to the proceeding
shall agree to abide by the arbitration award." Id. art 25, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1242.
119. Id.
120. The Dispute Settlement Understanding employs the term "case" in reference to
instances of disputes brought before the Dispute Settlement Body. See id. art. 3, para. 7, 33
I.L.M. at 1227.
121. Id. art. 3, para. 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
122. Id.
123. Id. art. 3, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
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impracticable, or is a temporary measure, compensation by the infring-
ing Member may be required. Third, as a "last resort," suspension of
concessions or other obligations of the complaining Member vis-i-vis
the infringing Member (e.g., retaliation or cross retaliation) may be im-
posed. 124
1. Consultation
When a Member country has reason to believe that another Member
has infringed upon the obligations assumed under a Covered Agreement,
it may call for consultations. 2 The language of the DSU makes it clear
that consultation is intended to play an important role in dispute settle-
ment and not simply exist as a formality before the establishment of a
panel. Article 3, paragraph 7 of the DSU makes this point clear:
Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as
to whether action under these procedures wouild be fruitful. The
aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties
to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly
to be preferred.'26
The parties to a dispute may at any point during the procedure resolve
the dispute by negotiated settlement. If the panel procedure could be
construed as adjudication under the modified system, consultation may
be regarded as negotiation, which could, continue, perhaps informally,
even after the commencement of the "judicial" or panel phase of the
dispute resolution mechanism.
Once the request for consultation is made by a Member, the respon-
dent will have ten days to reply, or a longer time by mutual agreement,
and should enter into consultations no later than ,thirty days from the
date of the request.'27 The request must be made in writing, indicating
the "legal basis for the complaint," and should state sufficiently the
infringing measures employed by the respondent 28 Where the respon-
dent fails to reply or enter into consultations within the allotted time, the
complainant may proceed to request the formation of a panel.'29
124. Id. art. 3, paras. 7 and 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1227-28.
125. Id. art. 4, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-29.
126. Id. art. 3, para. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
127. Id. art. 4, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-29.
128. Id. para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
129. Id. para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-29.
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During consultations, the Members in dispute are charged to make
an attempt to "obtain a satisfactory adjustment of the matter" in con-
fidential negotiations which, in reference to any further proceedings
beyond consultations, shall not prejudice the rights of either disputing
party.130 The parties have sixty days, or fewer in urgent cases,' 31 to settle
their differences. Where after sixty days 132 the consultations are a fail-
ure, the complaining party may request a panel. 33 Third party Members
believing they have a substantial trade interest in such consultations may
participate if the respondent agrees. If the respondent rejects a third
party Member's request for inclusion, the third party Member may
request separate consultations.' 34
a. Good Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation
Unlike consultation, where a complainant has the power to force a
respondent to reply and consult or face a panel, but like arbitration,
good offices, conciliation, or mediation are employed where both parties
to a dispute agree. 135 There are no requirements of form, time, or proce-
dure. Any party to the dispute may initiate them with the other party's
or parties' agreement at any time. Any single party may then terminate
good offices, conciliation, or mediation at any time. 136 In contrast to
consultation, initiation of good offices, conciliation, or mediation re-
quires unanimous agreement of the parties to a dispute but may be
recommended by any party. Furthermore, any party may terminate good
offices, conciliation, or mediation without unanimous agreement among
the parties to a dispute. Once these procedures have been terminated, the
complaining party may then request the formation of a panel.'37 Thus,
there are technically four or perhaps five avenues by which a complain-
ing party may reach a panel formation: consultation, good offices,
conciliation, mediation, and, possibly, during or after arbitration.
130. Id. paras. 5 and 6, 33 1.L.M. at 1229.
131. Along with complying with a provision that requires parties to a dispute in cases of
urgency to accelerate the consultation procedure - for example, a dispute involving perish-
able goods - Members must also enter into consultations in no more than ten days from the
consultation request for and must settle within twenty days of that request, or the complaining
Member may request the establishment of a panel. Id. paras. 7 and 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
132. The parties may jointly agree before sixty days that the consultations are a failure,
at which time the complainant may request that a panel be formed. Id.
133. Id. para. 7.
134. Id. para. 11.
135. Id. art. 5, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
136. Id. para. 3.
137. Compare id.
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2. Panel Phase
Once consultation, good offices, conciliation, or mediation has
broken down, and upon the request of a complaining party, the DSB
must form a panel unless it decides not to by consensus.138 Absent an
agreement by the parties to change them, the terms of reference for
panels shall be:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of
covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter
referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recom-
mendations or in giving rulings provided for in that/those agree-
ment(s). '39
In a development which may signal a significant step in the direc-
tion of adjudication, panels may be composed in normal cases only of
well qualified individuals who are not citizens of either of the disputing
parties. 4° Panels are to be composed of three, or where the parties
agree, five individuals.' 41 Panel members are to be selected "with a view
to insuring the independence of the members [of the panel].' 42 The
strong language preferring noncitizens of disputing parties is mitigated
somewhat by a loophole. Where both parties agree to appoint citizens,
their citizens may compose members of a panel. 43 Presumably, agree-
ment to appoint citizens would most likely occur between two parties of
equal or similar economic strength who may prefer to see their citizens
on a panel rather than to leave the decision to dispassionate "neutrals."
This possibility opens the panel process to the danger of becoming
nothing more than yet another consultation process. From the perspec-
tive of the pro-legalists, this loophole should be closed. Citizen panel-
ists, however, have been known to be objective in their deliberations
and have found against their own countries in previous panel reports.
Moreover, although they make final determinations on the facts of a
138. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
139. Id. art. 7, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-31.
140. Such persons include governmental or nongovernmental personnel who may have
served on a previous panel - as a representative to a WTO Member or a contracting party to
the GA'T - or have taught or published on international trade law or policy, or have served
as a senior trade policy representative of a Member of the WTO. Id. art. 8, para. 1, 33 I.L.M.
at 1231.
141. Id. para. 5.
142. Id. para. 2.
143. Disputing party citizens will be allowed only where both parties agree. Id. para. 3.
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case, panels do not have the last say on legal issues. Until the system
has garnered experience, this concern may be somewhat premature. This
troubling aspect of panel constitution is considerably alleviated by the
Appellate Body phase of dispute settlement. Furthermore, the DSU
requires independence of panelists even when they are citizens of dis-
puting parties. The Understanding forbids parties to a dispute who
appoint their citizens as panelists from influencing their citizen-panelists
or providing them with instructions.' 44 Inclusion of a similar provision
forbidding influence of noncitizen panelists may also have been prudent.
Of course, guaranteed selection of impartial panelists would be
optimal from the perspective of a rule oriented system. The Dispute
Settlement Understanding, however, presents a balance between legalists
and pragmatists; at least rhetorically, in the text, the legalists seem to
have gained an upper hand. What practice will bring is not yet clear.
However, early criticism has been positive. 45 The Secretariat is charged
with making nominations which the parties may not oppose except for
"compelling reasons."' 46 The parties must agree on the panelists within
twenty days of the establishment of the panel. When they' cannot agree,
the Director-General in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and
Chairman of a relevant council or committee of a covered agreement
shall appoint'the panelists.' 47
In addition to the selection process and composition of panels, the
key to determining whether panels will arrive at their decisions by a
process more akin to negotiation or adjudication is the panel.decision-
making process itself. Panels are to conduct confidential deliberations,
48
set deadlines, receive "pleadings" and rebuttals, and hear oral arguments
from the disputing parties. 149 In a provision that resembles a rudimentary
and surprisingly broad discovery rule, they may request information
from any appropriate body or source, including experts, and acquire
confidential information from a Member Nation's administrative bodies,
in some cases without that Member's approval. 150 Moreover,, they are
144. Id. para. 9.
145. See Mora, supra note 10, at 148-49.
146. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 48, art. 8, para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
147. Id. para. 7.
148. Id. art. 14, para. 1, 33 I.LM. at 1235.
149. Id. art. 12, paras. 3 and 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1233, and art. 15, para. i, 33 I.L.M. at
1235.
150. Although they do not require approval for the request, they must inform the
Member of the request "before a panel seeks such information." Id. art. 13, para. 1, 33 I.L.M.
at 1234.
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authorized to establish groups of experts to provide reports on factual or
scientific issues. After discovery and deliberation, a panel is to submit
a written report to the DSB containing its findings of law and fact, a
description of the applicability of relevant provisions, and the basic
rationale behind its decision. 52 From establishment to submission of the
report, a panel should, in normal cases, take no more than six months.'53
In a procedural nod to the pragmatists or rule skeptics, there is an
interim review stage where the panel presents an interim report to the
parties for their comments. Interestingly, the panel is required only to
hold further meetings with the parties. It is not required to modify its
findings in any way before submitting the report to the DSB but must
only include a discussion of the arguments presented at the interim
stage.'54 Once the panel report is submitted to the DSB, the report will
be adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report
or unless a party to the dispute appeals for Appellate Body review.
1 55
3. Appellate Body Review
Since a request for Appellate Body review is granted unless the
DSB rejects it by consensus, it is safe to say that losing parties will
almost always resort to appellate review where they believe it is in their
interests to do so. In most judicial systems, an appeal must attain some
minimum threshold to discourage frivolous appeals before it is heard by
an appellate tribunal. Under the auspices of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, no such threshold is established even for the clearest
cases of violation and impairment.
While the panel submits findings of fact and law, the Appellate
Body is limited in its determinations to questions of law and legal
interpretation. This limitation adds weight to the view that the new
dispute resolution system creates something of a judicial tribunal. Ap-
pellate Body "judges" are to be "persons of recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter
of the covered agreements generally.' 56 Appellate Body proceedings are
to be confidential, and the opinions submitted by the Body members are
151. Id. para. 2.
152. Id. art. 12, para. 7.
153. Panel deliberation may be extended by three months or in some cases suspended for
no more than twelve months. See id. art. 12, paras. 8-10 and 12, 33 I.L.M. at 1234; art. 20,
33 I.L.M. at 1237-38; and art. 21, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
154. Id. art. 15, 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
155. Id. art. 16, para. 4.
156. Id. art. 17, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
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to be anonymous. Therefore, Appellate Body members will not easily
come to be "branded" as possessing a bias in favor of or against a
particular Member or group of Members, and passive manipulation of
the composition of appellate panels will be avoided. Unlike in the panel
phase, parties will have no active role in choosing Appellate Body
members. Each case before the body will be chaired by three of the
seven appointed members, who will rotate according to a schedule
created by the body itself in consultation with the DSB Chairman and
the Director-General.157 Presumably, however, a party would be free to
time its appeal, within provided limitations, to coincide with the next
rotation of Appellate Body members. This possibility of passive manipu-
lation of the constitution of an appellate panel of "judges" should be no
great cause for concern, considering that there is much greater probabili-
ty of active manipulation of tribunals in national judicial systems
through venue changes and forum shopping. Also, passive manipulation
may be avoided as Appellate Body members sitting on any one case are
to be chosen by lot.
Where a party requests an appeal to the Appellate Body, the deliber-
ations must be completed and a written decision submitted no later than
sixty days for normal instances and at most ninety days from the formal
request of appeal. 158 Parties to the dispute are required to make written
submissions, and no ex parte proceedings- are allowed.159 An Appellate
Body decision may uphold, modify, or reverse a panel's legal findings
and conclusions. 16° As with panel formation and adoption of panel
reports, Appellate Body decisions are adopted without amendment
unless vetoed by consensus in the DSB.
4. Remedies
If a panel or Appellate Body finds the measure or trade practice of
a party to be in violation of the Covered Agreements, there are three
possible consequences for the Member in violation. The Member may
be required to bring the measure into conformity with the relevant
agreement within a "reasonable amount of time,'' or the complainant
157. Id. paras. 1 and 9.
158. Id. para. 5.
159. Id. art. 18, 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
160. id. art. 17, para. 13.
161. The "reasonable amount of time" is (I) proposed by the Member in violation; or
where such time period is not approved by the DSB (2) a period of time agreed by the parties
to the dispute; or where no agreement can be reach within forty-five days of adoption of the
report or decision (3) the period of time will be determined by binding arbitration within 90
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may proceed to temporary measures. If the Member fails to comply
within the "reasonable amount of time," the complaining party may call
for negotiations for compensation.' 62 Where no compensation is agreed
upon within twenty days after the expiration of the "reasonable amount
of time" period, the complainant may request that the DSB authorize
retaliation through suspension of the complainant's concessions or other
obligations to the Member in violation. At first, retaliation is to be
limited to the same sector and agreement. If the complainant believes
such retaliation would be insufficient, it may retaliate across sectors and
agreements. 163 The DSB must grant suspension within thirty days of
expiration of the reasonable period of time unless it vetoes the suspen-
sion request by consensus. The Member in violation has one final
recourse before implementation of the suspension order: it may object to
the level or scope of suspension. In such a case the Appellate Body
panel or an appointed arbitrator will examine only the question of
whether the level and scope of suspension is appropriate.164
a. Retaliation and Cross Retaliation
The complainant may suspend concessions or other obligations
originating from the same sectors of the same covered agreement the
respondent has violated. Where the complainant believes that such
suspension would not suffice, the suspension may extend to different
sectors of the same covered agreement. If still believed insufficient, it
may be extended further to another covered agreement. 165 "Sector" is
defined with respect to goods as "all goods." As to services, "sector" is
defined as described in the Services Sectoral Classification List.' 6 With
respect to the definition of "agreement" for this subsection, all agree-
ments listed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement are treated as a
whole. With respect to services, the GATS Agreement applies; for
intellectual property rights, the TRIPs Agreement is applicable.' 67 Where
days of the adoption of the report of decision. Id. art. 21, paras. 3(a)-(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
162. Payment of compensation is voluntary on the part of the Member in violation. Id.
art. 22, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
163. Id. para. 3. Cross retaliation is subject to a rather stringent procedure. Id. Where the
respondent believes that the complainant seeking cross retaliation has violated the provisions
of art. 22, the respondent may call for arbitration to determine whether the retaliation sought
is appropriate in light of art. 22 procedure. Id.
164. Id. para. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
165. Id. paras. 3(a)-(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
166. Of GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/W/120 and TRIPS, as described'in Sections 1-7 of Part
II, or obligations under Part III or Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement. See Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 48, art 22, para. 3(f), 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
167. Id. para. 3(g).
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a complaining party requests retaliation or cross retaliation, the respon-
dent has the right of arbitrational review of the appropriateness of the
authorized retaliation.
168
Hence, once a panel is formed, the procedure of the DSB provides a
series of decisions which, unless vetoed by a consensus vote of the DSB
at either the close of the panel or Appellate Body phases, will result,
theoretically, in a decision for the respondent or for the complainant. In
the latter instance, the decision may call for removal of the infringing
measure, compensation, or suspension of concessions and obligations
under the covered agreements. In antidumping and subsidies cases, the
DSB may authorize antidumping or countervailing' measures. Reports
must be adopted in toto and without amendment or modification by the
DSB. A report or decision is perhaps, as a result, more likely to be
adopted even against the objection of an economically strong disputing
party. The ultimate consequence for the violating member that refuses to
conform is that it may be faced with higher tariffs, quotas, or other
restrictions on trade.
5. Arbitration
Under the ITO, there were basically three phases of dispute resolu-
tion: (1) direct consultation; (2) arbitration; and (3) review of legal
issues by the World Court. Arbitration was intended to be the workhorse
of the ITO dispute resolution regime. In the WTO system, the panel and
Appellate phases are the central forces in the settlement of cases. Never-
theless, arbitration may play an important role in certain circumstances.
A respondent may call for arbitration to determine whether the princi-
ples and procedures set forth to arrive at a retaliation have been properly
followed. Retaliation may not commence until arbitration, which may
not last more than sixty days, is completed.
Arbitration is billed as an alternative and binding means to resolve a
disagreement without going through the DSB process, but it may only
be employed where the disputing parties mutually agree.1 69 Apparently,
because the parties are charged to "abide by the arbitration award," there
may be no recourse to review in the DSB, but the issue may yet be
challenged before a panel or Appellate Body for clarification. 170 In the
alternative, WTO Members may choose to form an interpretation to
clarify the issue.
168. Id. para. 6.
169. Id. art. 25, 33 I.L.M. at 1242.
170. Id. para. 3.
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6. Strengthening the Multilateral System
Under Article 23 of the DSU, the WTO, through its panels or
Appellate Bodies, becomes the ultimate arbiter of disputes between WTO
Members arising under the auspices of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
This development promises to be a radical departure from recent history
in disputes on international trade. Article 23 of the DSU provides:
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements
or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and
procedures of [the DSU].
In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been
impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accor-
dance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall
make any such determination consistent with the findings con-
. tained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB
or an arbitration award rendered Under this Understanding ....
(emphasis added)
Consequently, where Members resort to the WTO dispute settlement
regime, they are bound by the results of that procedure. Therefore, where
a Member violates a DSB adopted decision, it is also in violation of
Article 23(a). Even in disputes arising out of cases where the Uruguay
Round Agreements authorize government action, such as under the
Agreement on SCM or the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Members may avail
themselves of the arbitration or DSB procedure where they believe the
Member imposing the duty has not fulfilled its obligations under those
agreements. 171
7. Specific Provisions in the Covered Agreements
Generally speaking, where specific agreements depart from the
regulations for dispute settlement set down in the Dispute Settlement
171. Panels and Appellate Bodies are more limited in their review of national procedures
in anti-dumping cases than in countervailing duty cases.
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Understanding, they do so for the purpose of establishing the specific
cause of action giving rise to a case under which a complaint may be
brought. They also add some nuances by providing for special expert
groups which will assist panels formed by the DSB to arrive at their
factual conclusions.
C. Application of Dispute Settlement Decisions in United States Law
Courts of the United States have had occasion to pass on the very
question of the force of a GATT Dispute Settlement decision in U.S.
law. The determination in the courts usually hinges upon congressional
implementation of the trade agreement involved. In Suramerica de
Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States,72 Argentinean companies,
Suramerica and others, had been assessed countervailing and antidump-
ing duties by the Commerce Department. The Commerce Department's
decision was based in part upon an interpretation of the words "on
behalf of" in the antidumping legislation.'73 Suramerica argued that a
GATT panel decision had rejected the Commerce Department's defini-
tion of "on behalf of." Because the "legislative history of the [antidump-
ing] statute demonstrates Congress' intent to comply with GATT in
formulating these provisions,"'74 it was argued, the court should also
reject the Commerce Department's interpretation. The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to overturn the Commerce Department's
interpretation on the basis of the GATT panel decision "even if we were
convinced that Commerce's interpretation conflicts with the GATT"
because, in the court's opinion, the GATT was not controlling. Although
the court acknowledged Congress' interest in complying with U.S.
international obligations under the GATT, the court was bound not by
what it thought Congress "should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what
172. 966 F.2d 660 (1992). See also United States v. Guy Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 660
(4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) ("Imports from a foreign
country are foreign commerce subject to regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by
Congress alone.").
173. The provision at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671a(b)(l) (1988) provides:
(b) Initiation [of anti-dumping investigation] by petition. (1) Petition requirements.
A countervailing duty proceeding shall be commenced whenever an interested party
... files a petition with the administering authority, on behalf of an industry, which
alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty . . . . and which is
accompanied by information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting those
allegations .... (emphasis added).
174. Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 667.
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Congress in fact did."'' 75 Absent clear indication from Congress in the
implementing legislation, GATT obligations, where they conflict with
federal law, will not be given effect under U.S. law.
176
Considering the tradition of viewing U.S. commercial treaty obliga-
tions as non-self-executing obligations of the United States, it is safe to
assume that the Uruguay Round Agreements will attain only non-self-
executing status. Normally, non-self-executing treaty obligations have
precedence only over all prior and future state law. 77 If the North
American Free Trade Agreement implementation legislation is taken as
a model for the new Uruguay Round Agreements, then even its prece-
dence over state law may be in doubt.'78
175. Id. at 668.
176. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2504(a)(1993), which provides:
No provision of any trade agreement approved by the Congress under section
2503(a) of this title, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, which is in conflict with any statute of the United States shall be
given effect under the laws of the United States.
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 87, § 111, cmt. h; see also Robert A. Brand,
The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26
STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GAT7" in the Domestic
Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 199 (Meinhard
Hilf, et al. eds., 1986); John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 311-12 (1967); NEW MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 202-03, 205-10.
178. NEW MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 85-87; NAFrA Im-
plementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, § 102 (1993), which provides in part:
(a) Relationship to United States Law.
(1) United States law to prevail in conflict. - No provision of the Agreement nor
the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.
(2) Construction. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed -
(A)to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law
regarding - (i) the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health; (ii) the
protection of the environment; (iii) motor carrier or worker safety.
(B)to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States,
including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974; unless specifically provided for in
this Act.
Legal challenge. - No State law, or the application thereof, may be declared
invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or
application is inconsistent with the [NAFTA] Agreement, except in an action
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application
invalid.
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D. Dispute Settlement: Conclusions
The Dispute Settlement Understanding presents important procedural
and substantive changes within the obligations which existed between
the GATT Contracting Parties. The most important procedural innova-
tions in dispute settlement are: (1) the creation of a "unified" dispute
settlement system overcoming the problem of uncertainty in determining
which procedure should apply; (2) the establishment of a new organ, the
Appellate Body, for review of legal issues decided by panels; and (3)
the virtually ensured establishment of panels and Appellate Bodies and
unmodified adoption of their decisions through a type of reverse or
inverted consensus. Substantively, in a radical move, the Members of
the WTO have agreed that when they avail themselves of the dispute
settlement procedure of the DSU, they will be bound by the arbitration
award, or the panel or Appellate Body decision through Article 23(a) of
the DSU. Additionally, under WTO Agreement Article XVI, paragraph
4, WTO Members are required to conform their national laws, regula-
tions, and administrative procedures to the obligations of the Uruguay
Round Agreements. Where a Member does not do so, it may invite an
action before the DSB. As virtually every agreement gives Members the
right to appeal to the WTO, even in cases of application of countervail-
ing measures and antidumping duties, the WTO is to be the ultimate
arbiter of disputes between its Members and the interpreter of its obliga-
tions.
III. THE WTO SYSTEM - DIPLOMACY OR RULE OF LAW?
It is interesting to note that there exists a great divide among Con-
tracting Parties of the GATT as well as among commentators as to the
nature of GATT law and obligations. Over the years it has been argued
with some success that GATT dispute settlement has evolved into a
judicial system, while others have argued with equal fervor that it is a
type of negotiation process. The parties to this debate also have argued,
respectively, for an enhancement of GATT's judicial functions or called
for a pure negotiating mechanism. Both have argued that the other's
proposition would undermine the very nature of the GATT system.
179
179. For the Pro-legalists view, see William J. Davey, An Overview of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 5, 70 (1993) [hereinafter GATT HANDBOOK]; Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Preface to GATT HANDBOOK, supra, at xi; Petersmann, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS, supra
note 12; JAMES FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (1982); JOHN
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The debate over the nature of GATT "law" is imbedded in the greater
debate over the nature of international law. Professor Mora provides a
quite thorough list of categories into which commentators fall with
respect to their positions on the nature of international law and GATT
law. He writes:
One may draw a somewhat artificial line between those defending
a "rule oriented" approach in the conduct of international trade
relations and those who defend a "power oriented" approach [Jack-
son]. In the first category one would find the so-called "legalists"
[quoting Trimble] or "rule partisans," [quoting Koh] while the
second would contain "pragmatists" [Trimble] or "rule skeptics"
[Koh].[] From the first perspective it has been said that "GATT is
both in form and practice an illuminating example of law in inter-
national relations" [Fawcett]. It is "a model or prototype of a
legalistic type system of international regulation" [Jackson &
Davey]. According to this view GATT is law and international
obligation [Henkin]. For some scholars GATT rules have even
"near-divine status" [Tarullo about Petersmann]. Others, although
skeptical about the role of law in international trade relations, note
that "the international trade system looks more like a legal system
than do the areas of international law" [Tarullo]l.'80
A country's propensity to be a complainant or a respondent in a
dispute under the General Agreement reflects its tendency to align itself
with either of the two basic categories, pro-legalist or anti-legalist,
respectively. The United States and developing countries have tradition-
ally encouraged the development of GATT as a legal body while the EU
and Japan advocate GATT as a negotiating forum, arguing that it is not
a code of conduct authorizing penalties and countermeasures against
agreement violators but rather a mechanism of persuasion aiding the
Contracting Parties in finding mutually agreeable solutions to conflicts
in international trade.
H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 2, 282 (Supp. 1986); Harold H. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A
Perspective on the Proposed Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L
L. 193, 196-97 (1987).
For the pro-negotiators view, see Long, supra note 10, at 88; Philip R. Trimble, Interna-
tional Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1985); Hiroshi Kitamura,
Japan in the GATT, in GATT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY
FOR A STRONGER REGIME 47, 58 (Reinhard Rhode ed., 1990); C.F. Teese, A View from the
Dress Theatre of Trade Disputes, 5 WORLD ECONOMICS 43, 51 (1982); David K. Tarullo,
Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 533 (1985).
180. Mora, supra note 10, at 109-10.
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As of 1990, the United States had been involved in far more GATT
complaints than all the other Contracting Parties combined: one hundred
twenty-five of a total of two hundred seven complaints filed. Of those
one hundred twenty-five, the United States was the complainant in
seventy-three and the defendant in fifty-two. In contrast, the EEC and
EC 81 as a unit filed thirty complaints and was subject to fifty-two.
When looking at the EC countries individually from 1948-1973 where
they filed complaints individually or were named as defendants in-
dividually, they filed twenty-five complaints and were defendants in
thirty-nine. Thirteen of the cases were between EEC or EC countries.
Japan showed a reluctance to use the GATT dispute settlement regime,
filing only four complaints but was the defendant in nineteen disputes.
In the thirty-six disputes between the United States and EU, the United
States brought twenty-one complaints while the EU brought fifteen.
8 2
Including actions involving individual EU nations and the United States
with those between the entity of the EEC and the EC, thirty-nine were
filed by the United States against European countries and the EU and
fifteen by EU member states individually and the EU against the United
States. 8 3 Complaints by the United States against Japan counted for
eight disputes, while Japan filed only one complaint against the United
States. The EU filed four complaints against Japan, and Japan filed two
against the EU.
With these statistics in mind, one may see that, traditionally, the
United States has the reputation of being the complainant while the EU
and Japan tend to be defendants, although the EU has become much
more active in the last decade in filing complaints. The EU and Japan
have quite often been the lightning rod for the United States' frustration
on trade in the U.S. media and the U.S. Congress. That frustration is
quite often vented in international trade disputes initiated through the
GATT dispute settlement system. Considering the number of cases
against them, seventy-six including complaints against the European
181. The designated name for the EEC and the EC is presently the European Union or
EU, which came into existence under the auspices of the Maastricht Treaty on 1st November
1994. The complaints filed by or against the European entity from 1948-1990 were by or
against the EEC (1963-1986) and then by or against the EC (1986-1990). The European
Union at the time of this writing consists of fifteen Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and
Sweden joined the EU.
182. The first dispute between the European Economic Community (now the European
Union) and the United States was filed in October of 1963.
183. The last complaint filed by or against European country separately was Portugal
against the United States in September 1985.
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countries separately, it is understandable that the EU and Japan would
be less enthusiastic about the evolution of GATT as a judicial arbiter of
international trade disputes.
It is important to note that Article XXIII is silent as to which ap-
proach, adjudication or negotiation, might be appropriate. It is argued
that the very grant of authority in Article XXIII to determine the sound-
ness of nullification and impairment complaints and to recommend
retaliation is judicial in nature. This argument, although perhaps persua-
sive, is not conclusive considering that the results of negotiations be-
tween nations on disputes would and do generate similar results. For
example, when negotiations are unsatisfactory, there may be a resort to
retaliation or countermeasures. The operative questions for determining
whether the GATT system until 1994 was basically one of negotiation
or adjudication had been: What form would dispute settlement have
taken without the GATT system? Would it have been significantly
different?
A grant of authority to determine whether a violation of the GATT
exists and approval to retaliate for that violation does resemble a judicial
process but is arguably, at its root, negotiation dressed up in court-like
proceedings. One could take this reasoning to its extreme and posit,
accordingly, that all judicial proceedings from this perspective are
simply negotiations. However, effective national judicial proceedings
have a significantly different quality in that there is a judgment which is
final and both parties are bound to the decision by the power of the
state. The state can, through executive order, physically seize the losing
party's property or person to enforce a judgment. 84 With GATT, as with
other international organizations, even where there is deference to a
judicial body, such as the World Court, a party may reject a final
decision of the tribunal and refuse to implement it. Recent history has
demonstrated that the coordinated persuasion of the international com-
munity may be applied to bring wayward or renegade nations into
compliance with international norms. United Nations pressure in Desert
Storm and the present case of Bosnia present qualified examples. The
above is in a sense only a rehashing of the old problem of enforcement
of obligations under international law, but it goes further to show the
essential political nature, albeit with some elements of legal proceedings,
of the GATT dispute settlement system, at least in its first forty-five
years of existence. It is yet untested whether the WTO and the Covered
184. Historically, the power of the state to enforce judgements against powerful defen-
dants has not always been so complete. Thus, even this distinction has its limitations.
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Agreements will in reality bring a deeper legal quality to the system or
simply another complex and perhaps more effective form of negotiation.
Keeping in mind that a judicial system of sorts was planned in the
ruined ITO and that the international community, including the EU
states and Japan, was prepared to adopt it but for the United States'
failure to do so, the collapse of the ITO is instructive in undersianding
the dissatisfying results of the GATT dispute resolution system over its
four and one-half decades of use. The question that goes to the root of
the controversy is which approach, adjudication or negotiation, is most
appropriate in resolving international trade disputes?' It is essential to
establish an assumption upon which the inquiry will revolve. Granted
that compliance with international norms is to be preferred over non-
compliance, the question becomes which philosophical approach, ad-
judication or negotiation, will be most effective in securing com-
pliance.'86
A. The Critics on Adjudication and Negotiation
Critics of adjudication in GATT dispute settlement argue directly to
the point of effectiveness, contending that the dispute system would not
be more effective in bringing about compliance simply because all
disputes, whether adjudicated or negotiated, ultimately come to negotia-
tions between the Contracting Parties due to the system's inability to
enforce compliance. These critics argue that a propensity in GATT to
accentuate adjudication may bring about the opposite of its intended
effect for three reasons. First, an increased effort to judicialize the
proceedings may backfire if losing Members rebuff the WTO's attempts
at enforcement of its decisions, thus undermining other Members'
confidence in the entire system. Second, adjudication, which is naturally
contentious, can lead to a deepening of hostility between the disputing
parties because it places nations on two distinct sides of a dispute as
opposed to the more traditional method of negotiation and conciliation,
which attempts to find common ground on the way to reaching a solu-
185. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 93; JACKSON,
RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 60.
186. There are politicians, commentators, and legal scholars who entertain ideas tan-
tamount to encouraging a retreat from, if not totally scrapping, international norms governing
international trade. They propose acquiescence to theories of managed or fair trade: The
author does not deal with this issue in this work. Suffice it to say that the author is a con-
vinced "free-rule trader," that is, a free trader who respects the rule of international law. See
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries
(Washington, D.C: Institute for Intcrnational Economics, 1992) for support of the managed
trade view in economic circles.
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tion. Third, negotiation between nations, the traditional method of
international dispute resolution, could be undermined by adjudication
when adjudication proves ineffective. Once proceedings have ended and
a party ignores the final decision, an attempt to bring that party back to
the negotiating table after unsatisfactory proceedings may be all the
more difficult, especially after retaliation is authorized.
The critics of international legalism generally point out that law in
the international arena is ephemeral, existing only with the indulgence of
nations,'87 and that to speak of international laws as having power
beyond the will of nations is a fiction. A basic reason for this state of
affairs, they maintain, is that often international obligations conflict with
national interest. 188 As a result, an obligation will be discharged only as
long as its fulfillment lies within the national interest. Nevertheless,
these international rule skeptics insist that international obligations such
as those embodied in GATT are valuable because they provide a system
"through which trade problems are negotiated and compromised within
a general framework of rules."' 89
The legalists, on the other hand, fall into two camps: one practical,
the other radical. The practical camp maintains that the international
trading system profits from increased adherence to internationally agreed
rules and more effective dispute settlement.'" Itis a moderate legalistic
view and sustains a conviction that international rules such as GATT are
something of a dynamic tension or fusion between obligation and law.
The more radical scholars maintain that international rules of law should
act to restrain politics and political activity, especially activity that
diverts governments away from the pursuit of national or global eco-
nomic welfare in favor of protectionist and interventionist policies.'91
These visionary scholars realize the inherent need of the international
trading system to transcend certain aspects of national sovereignty and
protectionist interest in order that it may realize its goals.
187. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 88-89 (1984); Tarullo, supra note 179, at 26.
188. Long, supra note 10, at 7.
189. Trimble, supra note 179, at 1917.
190. Wolfgang Benedek, Preferential Treatment of Developing Countries in International
Trade-Past Experience and Future Perspectives, in FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NIEO, supra
note 82, at 71, 98-109; Tarullo, supra note 179.
191. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Improvements in the GATT Dispute Settle-
ment System: A Survey and Comparative Analysis, in FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NIEO, supra
note 82, at 340; Heinz Hauser, Foreign Trade Policy and the Function of Rules for Trade
Policy Making, in FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NIEO, supra note 82, at 18, 36-37.
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B. Conclusions on Diplomacy or Rule of Law
Despite interesting considerations on both sides as to whether GATT
or the WTO should be Mediator, Arbiter, or Judge, it is quite clear in
view of the international legal character of the organization that it will
continue to depend upon the good will of the parties to the agreement.
Members may withdraw from the WTO six months after delivery of
written notice to the Director-General. The Uruguay Round has, howev-
er, taken significant steps toward the creation of an effective internation-
al trade court, for instance through the provision in Article 23 of the
DSU. However it may ultimately evolve, the WTO is and will remain
for the foreseeable future a hybrid creature, both diplomatic and legal in
its constitution. There exists, nonetheless, the danger that if the legal
nature of this organization is developed too far too fast, it risks alienat-
ing its Member Nations. If the party in violation is one of the economi-
cally powerful nations, and, therefore, essential to further effectiveness
of the world trading system, it is unlikely that enforcement against such
a party where it is unwilling will be effective because the enforcement
mechanism relies solely upon cross retaliation in its extreme and might
ultimately undermine confidence in the system. Important in this consid-
eration is the provision in Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing which states:
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered
agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of
the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide
by, the rules and procedures of [the DSU]. (emphasis added)
Article 23, therefore, does not require WTO Members to seek redress
through the dispute settlement procedure in the WTO. It only requires
the Members who do so to abide by the decisions reached by its tribu-
nals or, consequently, face retaliation. This formulation provides an
escape valve for disputes too sensitive for any party to the dispute to
risk before a panel, Appellate Body, or even binding arbitration. Ul-
timately, therefore, the GATT, and in its newest form, the WTO, will
remain for the foreseeable future in some important respects a negotiat-
ing institution perhaps moving slowly but steadily in the direction of an
international judicial tribunal.
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The Uruguay Round promises dramatic economic results for the
world economy in the years ahead once its obligations are faithfully
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executed. It is not clear, however, how evenly the expected benefits will
fall between the developed and developing world. In fact, some com-
mentators believe that a net economic loss could occur in some develop-
ing countries. This consequence is due at least in part to the lower tariff
rates required by the agreements. Many developing countries depend
upon tariff revenues in lieu of taxes.
The achievement of the Uruguay Round results is to be supported at
least in part by significant changes in both the institutional structure of
GATT and its dispute settlement procedures. The most significant of
these changes brought by the new trade agreements is the replacement
of the GATT as an institutional organ by the World Trade Organization.
Beyond the very significant institutional improvements made within the
WTO in terms of administration and implementation of the agreements
under its charter, there is the new dispute settlement process ad-
ministered by the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism administered by the Trade Policy Review Body.
The Dispute Settlement Body is simply a special assembly of the
General Council, which is responsible for day to day functions of the
WTO and is composed of all WTO Members. Dispute settlement proce-
dures are to be, at least for the time being, initiated only by WTO
Members. Thus, the WTO or any of its subsidiary organs do not possess
executive authority in terms of enforcing its obligations. It may be
suggested, however, that the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, through
its administering body, should eventually be given the authority to bring
actions against violating Member States to enforce WTO obligations.
The Trade Policy Review Body does have authority to monitor trade
policies of WTO Member States and make reports to the Ministerial
Conference. The evolution of the WTO into a kind of world trade police
presents an interesting proposition which might facilitate the fulfillment
of the ITO's original role in the Bretton Woods System. Nevertheless
such a proposition is not without certain problems. For instance, the
method of enforcement created under the Uruguay Round Agreement's
Dispute Settlement Understanding is at present dependent upon Member
initiative and results in its extreme in "cross retaliation," which may
possess certain inherent limitations.
Where a dispute arises, parties first consult. Where consultation fails
to bring about a mutually agreeable solution, a party to the dispute may
call for the establishment of a panel. Panel reports may be appealed to
the Appellate Body for review of legal issues. Both establishment of
panels and Appellate Bodies and adoption of their decisions is to be
achieved through inverted consensus. Panels or Appellate Bodies are
established and their decisions are adopted unless the WTO Members
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present at the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body decide by con-
sensus not to establish the body or adopt its decision. Thus, establish-
ment of panels or Appellate Bodies and adoption of decisions are vir-
tually assured in all cases. The remedies available to a complaining
country are first, conformity of the violating Member's measures with
the Dispute Settlement Body adopted decision. If not achieved within
the time required by the decision, then the complaining party may
request compensation. If the parties cannot agree on compensation, then
the complaining party may request retaliation, and if it believes that
retaliation would be unsatisfactory, it may then request retaliation across
sectors and agreements.
It is questionable whether cross retaliation would be an effective
mechanism for ensuring compliance in all circumstances, especially in
cases of disputes where the complainant is a developing country and the
defendant a wealthy developed country. Retaliation was also available
under the GATT system and was employed only once, with little suc-
cess, in the U.S.,Dairy Quotas Case. Some scholars have argued that
retaliation authorized under the new system might also prove ineffective.
For instance, in a case between a small, relatively poor country as
plaintiff and a large, relatively wealthy country as respondent, where the
small country's total imports of the large country's products is a negligi-
ble portion of the latter's international trade, retaliation or cross retalia-
tion may have nothing more than the effect of a mosquito biting an ele-
phant; in other words not enough effect to encourage the larger country
to bring its violative measures into conformity. Retaliation as it is to be
applied in the present agreement is only between the parties to the
dispute. However, were the WTO itself to have the power to bring
complaints and to enforce them through multilateral retaliation or cross
retaliation, enforcement against larger and economically powerful Mem-
bers might prove more effective. Involved in this proposition is the
basic philosophy underpinning the multilateral trading system: whether
the system should be more legal or diplomatic in orientation. Specifical-
ly, the question is whether law or diplomacy best serves the economic
goals of the trading system. Granted that compliance to the obligations
will serve the economic goals of the system better than noncompliance,
which philosophical approach, adjudication or negotiation, will be most
effective in securing compliance?
Contracting Parties of the GATT as well as commentators disagree
as to what the nature of GATT or the WTO should be. Commentators
have argued somewhat successfully, for instance, that GATT, through its
dispute resolution system, has evolved into a judicial system. Neverthe-
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less, there is little evidence, if any, to support the proposition that
dispute settlement under GATT led to better implementation and en-
forcement of its obligations.
Critics of the legalist approach argue directly to the point of effect-
iveness, claiming that the dispute system would not be more effective in
bringing about compliance. simply because all disputes, whether adjudi-
cated or negotiated, ultimately come to negotiations. They maintain that
a propensity in GATT to accentuate adjudication may bring about the
opposite of its intended effect.
On the other hand, the pragmatic legalists maintain that the interna-
tional trading system profits from increased adherence to internationally
agreed rules and more effective dispute settlement. The radical legalists
argue that international rules of law should act to restrain politics and
political activity, especially activity that diverts governments away from
the pursuit of national or global economic welfare in favor of protec-
tionist and interventionist policies.
The system as proposed under the auspices of the Uruguay Round
does bring significant improvements and may lead to more effective
enforcement and thus higher efficiency. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable
future the international trading system as embodied by the World Trade
Organization will remain in important respects a negotiating institution.
Because of its new institutional charter, however, it has the potential to
develop more quickly 'and effectively into an international judicial
tribunal.
But the question remains to be answered: which philosophy, ad-
judication or negotiation, best serves the interests of the multilateral
trading system as it stands today? And which best serves the interests of
the developing world including the economies in transition? It remains
controversial whether the new agreements as they now stand can be
considered a net benefit for these countries. Were the system to develop
some dramatic new powers with multilateral cross retaliation or even
multilateral compensation, even countries with relatively small markets
may better experience the promised benefits. These powers would be
difficult to achieve considering the commensurate loss of national sover-
eignty they would mean for WTO Member Nations and those Members'
reticence, most notably that of the United States, to giving up national
powers.
The new institutional framework brought to the world trading sys-
tem by the WTO is very significant in terms of achieving its future
goals. An agreement on competition policy for an increasingly integrated
global market is one such goal whose importance cannot be under-
estimated. An agreement on competition policy under the auspices of the
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GATT was all but impossible considering that its competence extended
strictly to trade in goods, although certain agreements, such as those on
subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing measures, do deal indirectly
with competition policy and present a second best solution to the prob-
lem. Through the WTO, a negotiation for an agreement on competition
policy is considered a priority for the first round of negotiations con-
ducted under its auspices. Further areas of development for the multilat-
eral trading system under the auspices of the WTO may include agree-
ments on social and environmental, policy which have recently become
fashionable themes in trade talks. 92
A further development which should not be overlooked is the reju-
venation of the Bretton Woods System through the creation of the
WTO. Originally designed as a triumvirate between the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Trade Organiza-
tion, the Bretton Woods System was intended to work as a cooperative
effort between the three organizations. The WTO Agreement contains a
provision requiring it to cooperate where appropriate with the IMF and
the World Bank with a view to achieving greater coherence in global
economic policymaking. Originally it was foreseen that the IMF, World
Bank, and the ITO would support one another even through their execu-
tive powers in pursuit of their separate but complementary goals.
Whether the WTO will or should fulfill the ITO's role in Bretton
Woods is unclear. A certain degree of increased coordination between
the three organizations might be advantageous, but further discussion
may be necessary for determining to what degree an integrated effort to
achieve each institution's goals is desirable.
192. See Lavorel, supra note 1, at 28, 31.
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